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CONTRACTUAL WELFARE:
NON-ACCOUNTABILITY AND
DIMINISHED DEMOCRACY IN LOCAL
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS FOR
WELFARE-TO-WORK SERVICES
Barbara L. Bezdek*
INTRODUCTION
The Welfare State of the mid-twentieth century has been sup-
planted by the rise of the Contractual State, miring welfare reform
in the United States in this worldwide reinvention of government.
Moving people from welfare to work became a primary goal of
federal welfare policy with the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (the "Act"),' and the Tem-
porary Assistance for Needy Families ("TANF") program it cre-
ated.2 The Act restructured welfare administration by replacing
the prior entitlement-based program with fixed block grants to the
states, thereby devolving significant control over welfare policy
from the federal to the state level. This new structure also ex-
pressly permits states to devolve welfare policy and operations fur-
ther still, to the county and city levels, and even to private
vendors.3
* Professor Barbara Bezdek is an Associate Professor at the University of Mary-
land School of Law, where she teaches legal theory and practice. Professor Bezdek
received a B.A. from the University of South Carolina, a J.D. from Columbia Univer-
sity Law School, and an LL.M. from the Georgetown University Law Center. Her
current work in welfare reform includes community-based strategies to hold local
government accountable for privatization of welfare services. The author thanks Tisha
Edwards for her invaluable assistance.
1. Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.)
2. For a discussion of the Act, as well as the TANF program, see Mark Green-
berg, Welfare Restructuring and Working-Poor Family Policy: The New Context, in
HARD LABOR: WOMEN AND WORK IN THE POST-WELFARE ERA 30-44 (Joel F. Han-
dler & Lucie White eds., 1999) [hereinafter HARD LABOR]. See also Vadim
Mahmoudov, Are Workfare Participants "Employees"?: Legal Issues Presented by a
Two-Tiered Labor Force, 1998 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 349, 351-52 (1998). Among other
issues, Mahmoudov discusses the underlying theories behind workfare programs, in-
cluding those found in New York City, concluding that the "primary goal is not to
make welfare recipients employable and self-sufficient ... [r]ather, the goal is simply
to chase people off welfare." Id. at 353.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 604(a) (1999) ("[A] State to which a grant is made... may use the
grant ... in any matter that is reasonably calculated to accomplish the purpose of this
[Act].").
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As the "devolution revolution" manifests itself in the administra-
tion of welfare benefits, new issues of accountability-and indeed,
democracy-arise. Accountability problems multiply because fa-
miliar rules of administrative law do not clearly constrain the new
regime of the Contractual State. Moreover, devolution insulates
agency decisions from public input and judicial review, masking
whether welfare reform generally promotes permanent employ-
ment for recipients.
The erosion of administrative law structures diminishes democ-
racy in three respects. First, the rules of the new contractual re-
gime are not generated by processes that require or invite public
participation, even those analogous to the imperfect models of ad-
ministrative rulemaking. Second, the new contractual regime lacks
the transparency we have come to expect of rule-bound welfare
administration. 4 The Contractual Welfare State's core features-
its actors, powers, points of influence and access, and opportunities
for remedy-are downright opaque to the very citizens in whose
name welfare purports to be reformed. Third, there is no effective
method, and scant tools, by which citizens can obtain needed infor-
mation to judge the efficacy of the new system. The opacity of the
new regime compounds this information need because it disperses
the sources and accountability for collecting and dispensing rele-
vant information. For example, local governments need not pro-
duce information in a manner that institutionalizes or supports the
public's evaluation of the operations and outcomes of Contractual
Welfare.'
Part I of this article probes the deficits of Contractual Welfare
and canvasses potential solutions. Part II includes a case study of
Baltimore's own implementation-under a strong "work first" phi-
losophy, and in substantial reliance upon public and private ven-
dors for the delivery of work-related services-of the TANF
4. Alfred C. Aman, The New Administrative Law, in THE PROVINCE OF ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE LAW (Michael Taggart ed., 1997). Transparency refers to the openness
commonly associated with democratic processes.
5. New strategies for strengthening the social and technological capacity of local
communities to collect and use information effectively are in development. E.g.,
TERRI J. BAILEY, URBAN INST., BUILDING COMMUNITY CAPACITY TO USE INFORMA-
TION (1997) (arguing that the effective use of information enhances community-build-
ing activities), available at www.urban.org/nnip/pdf/baileyl.pdf. Bailey's four steps to
achieving this goal are: "(a) assessing community information capacity, (b) strength-
ening the social and technological communications networks available in the commu-
nity, (c) building skills to use information for community change, and (d) providing
technical assistance in support of community use of information." Id. at 1.
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program.6 Part III offers some direction as to where this process
can and should go from here.7
The case study illustrates key features of the nation's massive
shift from public to private provision of social services, long the
province of government.8 This rapid and remarkable change has
been accompanied by dramatic declines in welfare caseloads, a na-
tional average of forty-two percent between 1993 and 1998. 9 These
declines most likely reflect multiple factors such as the booming
economy, increases in the minimum wage, and certain structural
changes within the system. 10 Presumably, decreased benefits and
state work requirements have influenced this decline as well. 1 The
government's ongoing use of private contracts in this rapid change,
however, raises troubling issues of accountability and efficacy.
Whether welfare agencies and their contractors are in fact aiding
TANF recipients to find employment, on penalty of sanctions and
the deepening poverty of their children, is a question of great pub-
lic concern. Only an accounting from public officials can reveal
whether families who leave the welfare rolls are swimming along in
the swirling new economy, or are sinking out of sight into unem-
ployment and child-risking poverty. The new structure of welfare
makes this accounting all the more elusive.
The Act of 1996 replaced the old AFDC program with TANF,
abolishing entitlement to assistance by any individual or family
under any state program so funded. 2 Under the Act, states must
require all parents or caretakers receiving assistance to work,
6. Infra Part II.
7. Infra Part III.
8. Infra Part II.
9. N.Y. TIMES ON THE WEB, Drop in the Rolls, at http://www.nytimes/com/li-
brary/politics/090198welfare-map.html (providing an interactive web page that allows
users to access welfare statistics from across the country). The national average ob-
scures the lower reductions in the populous states of California (22%) and New York
(26%), as well as the much higher reduction in Wisconsin (87%). Id. Maryland's rate
according to this source is 48%. Id.
10. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, THE EFFECTS OF WELFARE POLICY AND THE
ECONOMIC EXPANSION ON WELFARE CASELOADS: AN UPDATE (1999) (describing its
effort to build a model that would segregate and identify the effects of specific
changes in welfare policy). The Council attributed 26-36% of the decline in the rolls
to the strong labor market, 10% to the increase in federal and state minimum wages
for the period 1993-96, and one-third of the decline to the shift from Aid to Families
with Dependent Children ("AFDC") to TANF. For a collection of relevant data re-
garding the shift from AFDC to TANF, see U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES, INDICATORS OF WELFARE DEPENDENCE, 2000, at app.A: Program Data,
2000, http://www.aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/indicatorsO0/apa.htm.
11. Strict sanction policies were associated with declines in caseload. Id. at 18.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 601(b) (1999).
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"once the State determines the parent or caretaker is ready to en-
gage in work, or once the parent or caretaker has received assis-
tance under the program for 24 months (whether or not
consecutive), whichever is earlier."13 Federal TANF monies may
not be used to provide cash assistance to a family that "includes an
adult who has received assistance . . . for 60 months,"14 and a
state's federal grant will be reduced if the state fails to meet the
mandatory work "participation rates" set in the Act.15 The excep-
tions to the work requirements are few, albeit significant. For ex-
ample, single parents with infants under the age of twelve months
may be excused from mandatory work,16 as may single custodial
parents caring for a child who is not yet six years of age, and who
can demonstrate the inability to obtain needed child care. 7 Count-
able work activities for the state include actual employment, of
course, but also a variety of activities ostensibly related to work,
but not necessarily leading to sustainable employment or clearly
calculated to do so. 8
The risk that agencies may direct TANF recipients into activities
that satisfy the state's federal obligations-but do not aid parents
in finding permanent employment that supports their families-
13. Id. § 602(a)(1)(A)(ii). Parents not working must engage in approved commu-
nity service after they have been on the assistance rolls for two months. Id.
§ 602(a)(1)(B)(iv). The number of persons who can be counted as "working" if they
are attending school or vocational educational programs is stringently limited. Id.
§ 607(d)(8) (limiting vocational education to twelve months); id. at § 607(d)(10) (stat-
ing that education counts as work only until the recipient gains a high school
diploma).
14. Id. § 608(a)(7)(A).
15. Id. § 607(a)(l) (setting "minimum participation rates" of 25% in 1997, rising to
50% by 2002, for single-parent families); Id. § 607(a)(2) (setting the minimum partici-
pation rate for two-parent families at 75% for 1997, and 90% by 2002).
16. Id. § 607(b)(5).
17. Id. § 607(e)(2).
18. The TANF affords states broad flexibility to select and structure work-related
activities, subject to the participation rates and the twenty-four-month work require-
ment. The federal law also permits states to include as work activities the following:
community service, adult basic education and English as a Second Language ("ESL"),
education directly related to employment or post-secondary education not so related,job readiness activities, job search and skills training, on-the-job training, as well as
subsidized employment in the public or private sectors. Id. § 607(d)(1)-(12). Each
state then designates, under its own policy, which work activities satisfy the individual
recipient's obligation to participate in employment-related activities. A useful over-
view of the issues, and a fifty-state comparison of state provisions, is available from
the STATE POLICY DOCUMENTATION PROJECT, TANF WORK ACTIVITIES AND RE-
QUIREMENTS, 2001, http://www.spdp.org/tanf/work.htm. Many states prescribe an au-
thorized list of work activities, then further devolve the policy decisions by
authorizing their counties to tailor local programs as they see fit.
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makes it imperative to examine the actual policies, practices, and
objectives of the state as it spends not only the federal block grant,
but also the recipients' lifetime welfare limit. This article analyzes
two related problems posed by government's use of contracts for
purchasing welfare-to-work services. The first is an accountability
problem: the duty of public officials and managers to explain or
justify their actions, and to provide a remedy to those members of
the public who suffer loss or injustice. The second is a problem of
administrative efficacy: the issue of maximizing performance
through these new institutional arrangements.
Citizens and policymakers are in uncharted waters. The New
Federalism devolves many changed and complex obligations to
state and local, governments, giving rise to a New Localism. Fur-
thermore, today's New Economy has forced this nation to revamp
its vision of human capital by raising the quality of American edu-
cation and workforce development-all symbolized by a New
Workforce-Investment enthusiasm at the federal level.' 9
The roles and responsibilities of the welfare bureaucracy have
changed rapidly and dramatically. Local agencies, which for de-
cades provided and withheld cash assistance, now are expected to
move welfare recipients to work. Within this sea change at the
agency level, caseworkers' roles and responsibilities have changed
as well. Now it is up to the welfare intake worker to assess a TANF
applicant's needs, skills, and interests, and to match each client to a
range of services identified by agency administrators to move re-
cipients off the welfare rolls and into the workforce.
Shaping the context of the caseworkers' shifting responsibilities
is the juggernaut of privatization. To comply with TANF, many
states are privatizing by contracting out services that have long
been the province of government, or by purchasing a patchwork of
services beyond their training and experience. The usual rationale
for privatization is to bring to government the presumed efficien-
cies and innovations of the marketplace, including management by
performance outcomes and profitability.2 °
19. Workforce Investment Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-220, 112 Stat. 936 (codi-
fied as 29 U.S.C. § 2811 (1999)). For greater detail on the Workforce Investment Act,
see infra note 129 and accompanying text.
20. Recent press accounts, however, show that the reality does not always live up
to the rationale. In Florida, Lockheed Martin IMS and MAXIMUS, Inc. contracted
with the state to enforce child support payments in conjunction with its welfare re-
forms. The two companies received $4.5 million to collect $162,000. Deadbeat Parents
Slip Away, State Pays $4 Million, Collects Little, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Dec. 30, 1998, at
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It is not obvious which new mechanisms will permit citizens to
hold state and local governments accountable in their performance
of these new roles and responsibilities. Under the former AFDC
system, welfare administrators could be held accountable for their
policies, in part, through notice and comment rulemaking.21 More-
over, judicial review afforded a measure of substantive review of
agency policies, reinforcing the principle of public participation in-
herent in notice and comment rulemaking.22
Regulatory procedures under a due process model require first
naming an action as harmful, blaming the responsible agent, and
then claiming redress.2 3 In the contractual system, however, agen-
cies feel freer to make fewer rules that are subject to the devices of
oversight. Without the specification of injury and designation of
blame-bearers, individual hearings are less effective means for
naming, blaming, or claiming for injuries resulting from, and em-
bodied in, a web of poorly designed or implemented contracted
services. Indeed, much of what the new model of welfare-to-work
staff does is to assign welfare clients to job readiness or work-train-
ing vendors. The staff person either dispenses or withholds advice,
encouragement, or understanding of clients' particular needs for
childcare, transportation, or care for disabled family members at
home. Furthermore, many actions taken by welfare workers are
not treated as "determinations" subject to review, nor are unfair
decisions captured as the denial of "benefits" that can be vindi-
cated in the hearing process.
New forms of governmental accountability are required. These
measures should include invigorated forms of public input and
oversight-an upgraded toolkit of citizen action, if you will-in or-
D1. Astonishingly, both Lockheed and MAXIMUS say that despite that level of pay-
ment, they remain unable to turn a profit.
California dumped Lockheed when the cost of child support collection skyrocketed
from $99 million to $277 million. D.A. Needs Solutions Not Excuses, L.A. TIMES, Nov.
19, 1998, at B8.
In 1999, Maryland also terminated its Lockheed contract for child support collec-
tion after performance fell far short of expectations. Greg Garland, Corporation Set to
Collect Child Support; Previous Contractor Replaced by State After Complaints,
Shortfalls, BALT. SUN, Oct. 31, 1999, at lB.
21. Matthew Diller, The Revolution in Welfare Administration: Rules, Discretion,
and Entrepreneurial Government, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1121, 1189 (2000). "The mecha-
nisms of notice and comment rulemaking and judicial review provide that generally
applicable rules are given a public airing and can be tested through judicial review for
compliance with legal standards and rationality." Id.
22. Id.
23. William L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes:
Naming, Blaming, Claiming..., 15 L. & Soc'x REV. 631, 633-37 (1980-81).
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der to hold government to higher levels of performance for its ar-
ticulated policy objectives. Also ripe for review is the premise for
double-devolution by states to local governments for welfare-to-
work services under TANF. I argue for state limits on local control
of welfare-to-work services comparable to those retained for
workforce and economic development.
I. CONTRACTUAL WELFARE
A. Privatization's Premises
Decentralization and privatization are movements that encircle
the globe. With particular force in Western democracies, national
governments are trying to reduce their roles, lower public spend-
ing, trim the direct provision of services, and rely more on private
markets. The anti-big government movement is a general retreat
from collectivism and emphasizes private property and freedom of
contract.24 Although often cast in economic terms of costs, bene-
fits, efficiency, and program management, this is really a watershed
about governance, the uses of power in society, and the boundaries
between public action and private concerns.25
Despite recent legislation purporting to curb non-funded man-
dates, the federal government continues to require state programs,
and the states themselves continue to require comparable county
and local programs. Increasingly, public activities are carried out
at the local level. The ideological underpinning for decentraliza-
tion of government services in the United States is that bloated
bureaucracies are inefficient and out of touch-that government
could do more with less if it had fewer resources, was under the
control of ordinary citizens at the local level, and followed the in-
centive systems of the private sector. Themes of freedom, effi-
ciency, and accountability sound in the chorus for devolution.26 In
24. JOEL F. HANDLER, DOWN FROM BUREAUCRACY: THE AMBIGUITY OF PRIVA-
TIZATION AND EMPOWERMENT (1996) (discussing the decentralized nature of welfare
administration in the U.S.); CASS SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION:
RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE (1990).
25. Some theorists on the Left also reject the modern liberal-capitalist welfare
state and see opportunities for enhanced democratic politics in contemporary decen-
tralization and privatization in the U.S. and in Europe. Variously nominated "new
social movements," e.g., SIDNEY TARROW, STRUGGLE, POLITICS AND REFORM: COL-
LECTIVE ACTION, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND CYCLES OF PROTEST (1989), "new popu-
lism," e.g., CARL BOGGS, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND POLITICAL POWER: EMERGING
FORMS OF RADICALISM IN THE WEST (1986), or "postmodernism," e.g., HANDLER,
supra note 24, these movements reject conventional politics for small-scale, decentral-
ized, anti-hierarchical, and direct democracy.
26. E.g., HANDLER, supra note 24.
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this anthem, both local control and the market are said to enhance
the power of citizens, who can either reach the local administrators
or can vote with their feet.
Privatization by contracting services to other providers is a famil-
iar arrangement in the United States. Typically, the government
entity retains responsibility for funding the public services, while
delegating authority for some or many aspects of providing those
services to the private sector. The most familiar example may be
defense contracting. Estimates suggest that more than half of all
government spending on goods and services is financed publicly,
yet produced privately. 7
Contracting out is not entirely new in the delivery of public assis-
tance either. Non-governmental entities have been partners in the
delivery of government-funded human services since the New Deal
inaugurated the expansion of the federal government's role in pro-
viding welfare, and social services continue to be delivered through
a tapestry of public and private agencies across federal, state, and
local levels. 28 The Act now authorizes states to employ private en-
tities to conduct intake and make eligibility determinations2 9-
traditional gate-keeping functions of any benefits program-most
often identified with the legal protections developed under
AFDC.30 Although nonprofits have been involved in service deliv-
ery for decades, the Act has brought for-profit enterprises into so-
cial services functions far beyond their prior limited roles as
contractors for data systems. 31
Unlike government agencies, contracted service providers have
the added incentive of compensation, which may affect the provid-
ers' quality of service as well as accountability. This diminished or
modified role of government, and the ensuing reliance upon non-
27. In the U.S., the social protection system often is assumed to be state-centric,
but it is, in fact, a hybrid. The state provides income support, some health care, much
housing, and many social or human services. But the private sector delivers other,
important aspects of the social protection function: employment-based health care,
pensions, and a vast array of services offered by private nonprofits. Families, or
households, are likewise important players in providing care and socialization for chil-
dren, as well as health care and general social support. Id. at 7.
28. LESTER M. SALAMON, PARTNERS IN PUBLIC SERVICE: GOVERNMENT-NON-
PROFIT RELATIONS IN THE MODERN WELFARE STATE 15 (1995).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 604(a) (1999).
30. E.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (extending procedural safeguards
to welfare recipients facing termination of benefits).
31. DEMETRA S. NIGHTINGALE & NANCY PINDUS, PRIVATIZATION OF PUBLIC SO-
CIAL SERVICES: A BACKGROUND PAPER 5 (1997) (concluding that although neither
system may be superior, the key factor is whether there exists accountability for re-
sults), http://www.urban.org/pubman/privitiz.html.
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governmental entities for the delivery of welfare benefits, under-
scores the importance of discerning whether welfare recipients
have any enforceable rights against welfare providers.
Private sector roles in social service are evident in the early his-
tory of outdoor relief,32 the move to indoor relief early in the nine-
teenth century,33 and the scientific charity 34 and settlement house
movements.35 In the face of industrialization, urbanization, immi-
gration, and increased poverty, the government assumed greater
responsibility for poverty relief in the twentieth century-evinced
by mother's pension statutes and the Social Security Act.36 But
even as the Welfare State expanded, it did so in extended coopera-
tion with private partners. The 1960s' War on Poverty greatly in-
creased the roles of the private sector in delivering services such as
job training, education, and placement, although these were funded
by the government. The 1980s' "war on welfare" slashed benefits
and programs, and increased exhortation to private volunteers to
defeat what increasingly came to be seen as a "culture of depen-
dency. '37 Under AFDC waivers and the Act, states experienced
32. Joel F. Handler, American Regulatory Policy: Have We Found the "Third
Way": The "Third Way" or the Old Way?, 48 KAN. L. REV. 765, 778-80 (2000) (outlin-
ing the history of previous welfare reform attempts). Outdoor relief was the doling of
public assistance to recipients without requiring them to work or live in poorhouses.
Id. at 778-79. It was believed by many reformists of the nineteenth century that it was
the "indiscriminate giving of aid which destroyed the desire to work." Id. at 778 (cit-
ing MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF
WELFARE IN AMERICA 40 (1986)).
33. Indoor relief required recipients to live in poorhouses, where they could be
observed and made to work. Id. at 779. Poorhouses often subjected the poor to
deplorable conditions, and proved to be more costly than outdoor relief. Id. (citing
KATZ, supra note 32, at 38).
34. Scientific charity was a method of assistance that endeavored to reinforce, or
at the very least not weaken, the work ethic of the poor. Handler, supra note 32, at
779. Scientific charity relied on private charities to administer the relief for several
reasons, including the fact that such relief would not be considered a public right, and
that private charities would be more effective in exerting moral influence over the
recipients. Id. (citing WALTER I. TRATTNER, FROM POOR LAW TO WELFARE STATE:
A HISTORY OF SOCIAL WELFARE IN AMERICA 56 (3d ed. 1984)).
35. Perhaps the best known settlement house project was Jane Addams' Hull
House in Chicago, 11. These homes were typically run by women and provided a
variety of charity services to the poor. See generally JANE ADDAMS, TWENTY YEARS
AT HULL HOUSE (1910).
36. The AFDC was adopted in the Social Security Act to provide federal funding
to state run "mother's pensions," which provided aid to families with needy depen-
dent children. Diann Dawson, The Evolution of a Federal Family Law Policy Under
Title IV-A of the Social Secuity Act: The Aid to Families with Dependent Children
Program, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 197 (1986).
37. CHARLES A. MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY, 1950-
1980 (1984); Brigid Kennedy-Pfister, Continuity and Contradiction in the Theory and
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enhanced freedom and encouragement to cure their own deficien-
cies by increasingly paying private "partners" to deliver public
help.
Although not entirely new, the now pervasive use of procure-
ment in the welfare arena tends to impugn the idea that smaller
units of government are necessarily more democratic-a central
premise of political devotees of devolution.38 Physical proximity to
the people affected by state or local policies and practices does not
alone prompt the state to create mechanisms of accountability. In-
deed, some structural reasons indicate that the poor fare better
when the decisions are made in larger rather than smaller polities.
For example, well-off suburban voters dominate the politics of sev-
eral states.39 Students of locality politics have observed that, when
policies are set at the local level, competition between jurisdictions
decreases the generosity of programs that aid the poor.4 °
B. Limitations of Administrative Law to Ensure Government
Accountability in the Contractual Welfare State
For a long time, this country has lived with national ambivalence
about the provision of welfare. David Ellwood has suggested that
the history of welfare policy reveals a series of attempts to help
people without infringing on their basic values of autonomy, work,
family, and community.4" Even in the AFDC era, the underlying
Discourse of Dependence, 28 FORDHAM URn. L.J. 667 (2001) (dissecting the political
meanings of the otherwise ambiguous terms "independent" and "dependent").
38. DANIEL J. ELAZAR, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A VIEW FROM THE STATES 216
(1966) (extolling "maximization of local control over the political and administrative
decision makers whose actions affect the lives of every citizen").
39. Sheryll D. Cashin, Federalism, Welfare Reform, and the Minority Poor: Ac-
counting for the Tyranny of State Majorities, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 552, 577 (1999) (stat-
ing that politically weak minorities, such as welfare recipients, are often at the whim
of political majorities in state and local governments).
40. E.g., DAVID RUSK, BALTIMORE UNBOUND: CREATING A GREATER BALTI-
MORE REGION FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: A STRATEGY REPORT (1996);
Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I-The Structure of Local Government Law, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 63 (1990); PAUL E. PETERSON, CITY LIMITS 41-65 (1981).
Joel Handler argues that this competition illustrates allocation "down" to smaller
units of government as well as the jurisdictional authority over conflicting policy deci-
sions. The most controversial issues are allocated to localities for discretion, while the
contours of the policy-the myth-is articulated at the federal and state levels. This
allocation minimizes their visibility, permits management by myth and ceremony, and
permits little actual change as the welfare programs undergo repeated formal re-
forms-still governed by three major ideological fault lines of industrial discipline
(the work ethic), race, and partriarchy. HANDLER, supra note 24, at ch. 3.
41. DAVID T. ELLWOOD, POOR SUPPORT: POVERTY IN THE AMERICAN FAMILY 16
(1988) (listing his view of the Four Value Tenets of Americans).
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philosophy of welfare policy in the United States was one of lim-
ited entitlement, through the protections offered by procedural due
process. Repeated attempts by poor people's advocates to cloak
public assistance with substantive constitutional values have been
steadfastly resisted by courts.42 Now that the national commitment
to an entitlement philosophy has been terminated expressly by the
Act,43 the deck is cleared for a new formula for public benefits, one
based on reciprocal contract and the exchange of work for
benefits."
Important staples of the due process model of welfare policy do
not penetrate to local governments' contractual partners in the new
regime of devolved responsibilities. Moreover, if vendors design
the services actually delivered to welfare recipients-absent mean-
ingful prescription or oversight by the agencies that are in theory
responsive through ordinary democratic channels-we suffer di-
minished democracy in policy design and implementation.
Administrative procedure acts46 and public information laws4 7
often do not apply to private contractors. The Supreme Court has
42. William H. Simon, The Invention and Reinvention of Welfare Rights, 44 MD. L.
REV. 1 (1985); Rand E. Rosenblatt, Legal Entitlement and Welfare Benefits, in THE
POLITICS OF LAW 262-64 (David Kairys ed., 1982).
43. At least for poor mothers turning to welfare. The end of welfare entitlement is
not the end of the entitlement era. Two emblems of the New Deal-Social Security
and Medicare-were the top priorities for protection by both major party candidates
in the sharply divided election for President of the United States in 2000.
44. MICHAEL NOVAK, THE NEW CONSENSUS ON FAMILY AND WELFARE 93-95
(1987) (asserting that "government assistance alone is not enough").
45. Democratic constraints on agency discretion may be formal, such as those im-
posed by the legislature, through statutory controls, legislative history, oversight, ap-
propriations, statutory review of agency rules, confirmation of key personnel; by the
appointments and directives of the executive branch; and by judicial review of agency
rules and "actions." Peter H. Schuck, Delegation and Democracy: Comments on
David Schoenbrod, 20 CARDOZO L. REV, 775, 783-90 (1999). Informal agency norms
also may promote the democratic regard inherent in due process-for example, when
an organizational culture is committed to the rule of law. Diller, supra note 21, at
1126-27. Additional constraints are achieved sometimes through interest group
monitors, participation in formal and informal agency decisionmaking, and mobiliza-
tion of opposition to policies, although the success of these means are unpredictable
and variable, and in important degree limited by the resources and organizational
capacity of the affected interests. Media constitute an additional device for addressing
agency action, by indirectly communicating to both the general public and specialized
audiences.
46. E.g., Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (exempting
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services from notice and comment in
issuing peer review standards in the Medicare program). The court concluded that the
standards contained in contracts with Peer Review Organizations, including perform-
ance objectives and criteria, were "rules" within the meaning of the federal Adminis-
trative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. § 533 (1999). As such, they were exempt
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held that receiving money under a grant does not turn the recipient
into a government agent, nor create a joint venture between gov-
ernment and grantee. 48 Data generated by privately controlled or-
ganizations, whether or not received and used by the government
agency, do not constitute "agency records. ' ' 49  Consultants em-
ployed to improve the quality of the agency's work are not
"agency" actors, unless they have legal authority to make decisions
as the agency's own.5 0
Rules governing public procurement are implemented princi-
pally to protect the integrity of the competitive process. They are
not intended or designed as means of soliciting public input into
policy.51 The ABA Model Procurement Code ("Model Code") an-
ticipates an administrative review process for contract awards, but
only upon challenge by an "actual or prospective bidder, offeror or
contractor who is aggrieved. 52
As a vehicle for public participation in the development of con-
tract specifications, the selection of contractors, or the enforcement
of contract terms, procurement procedures generally fail. Bidders
and procurement officials alike tend to view bids, and all informa-
tion about the evaluation of bids and bidders, as confidential, until
the bidding period is closed and the award is made. 53 Private, par-
from notice and comment as either general statements of policy, or because they dealt
with procedural matters. Am. Hosp. Ass'n, 834 F.2d at 1053. Judge Wald, however,
did assert that agencies may not evade the APA by placing substantive rules in con-
tracts. Id. at 1054.
47. E.g., Craig Feiser, Privatization and the Freedom of Information Act: An Anal-
ysis of Public Access to Private Entities under Federal Law, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 21
(1999) (proposing that federal courts adopt broader definitions of "agency" and
"agency record" to protect the public's right to information); Nicole B. Casarez, Fur-
thering the Accountability Principle in Privatized Federal Corrections: The Need for
Access to Private Prison Records, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 249 (1995) (reporting that
the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000), fails to permit access to docu-
ments created and maintained by privatized prisons).
48. Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169 (1980) (upholding the government's "preva-
lent practice" of preserving the autonomy of federal grantees, both for data never
received by the agency, and for documents created by the grantee to which the gov-
ernment has access and has used).
49. Id.
50. Wash. Res. Project, Inc. v. Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 504 F.2d 238,
246-48 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
51. AM. BAR. ASS'N, MODEL PROCUREMENT CODE FOR STATE AND LOCAL Gov-
ERNMENTS (1979) (containing "statutory principals and policy guidance for managing
and controlling the procurement of supplies, services, and construction for public
purposes").
52. Id. § 9-101; see also id. § 9-501 (creating the Procurement Appeals Board).
53. NAT'L Ass'N OF STATE PURCHASING OFFICIALS ("NASPO"), STATE AND Lo-
CAL GOVERNMENT PURCHASING: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 55-56, 114 (5th ed. 1997)
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ticularly for-profit, bidders may well desire the procedures to pro-
tect their proprietary information. Both MAXIMUS and
Lockheed made such claims when they competed to win contracts
to provide aspects of Chicago's welfare services in 1997.54
Concerns about procurement processes have been raised in sev-
eral jurisdictions, as those states and cities devise procedures that
do not comply with the recommendations of the Model Code or of
NASPO. In 1999, New York City awarded $500 million in con-
tracts to private entities to provide job training and placement to
welfare recipients, using a process of "negotiated acquisition" in-
stead of competitive bidding. Although this could have offered a
foothold for more public consultation, the contracts were let with
virtually no opportunity for public input. 6 Critics fault the process
for permitting increased cronyism. 7 Disputes persist in New York
City about whether such contracts violated city procurement pro-
cedures following the city comptroller's complaints that contracts
were not bid out, lacked specific information about the services to
be provided, and provided compensation in excess of the amount
requested by the company.58
Similar concerns have been raised elsewhere, including Milwau-
kee, Wisconsin 59 and Washington, D.C. 60 In Washington, an audit
identified $50 million in welfare-to-work job training contracts that
(advising that public information requests can be "an impediment to public procure-
ment unless the law of the jurisdiction recognizes and accommodates proprietary
information").
54. Diller, supra note 21, at1199 (citing Merrill Goozner, Welfare's Gold Rush:
Private Sector Mining Hard for Reform Effort's Contracts, CHI. TRIB., June 29, 1997,
at 1).
55. Edward Costikyan & Leslie U. Cornfeld, NYC's New Procurement Structure:
Birth of an Imperial Agency, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 22, 1990, at 1 (referring to the procure-
ment provisions, including negotiated acquisition, in the New York City Charter).
56. Diller, supra note 21, at 1199 (citing Kathleen McGowan, Shh... We're Hunt-
ing Big Bucks, CITY LIMITS, Dec. 6, 1999, at 1).
57. Robert Pollner, Fast City Contracts, but at What Price?, NEWSDAY, Mar. 27,
2000, at A8 (explaining how negotiated acquisition "allows city agencies to skirt com-
petitive bidding").
58. Nina Bernstein, Welfare Plan in City Suffers A Setback, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3,
2000 at B1. MAXIMUS asked to be paid $4175 per client, but the contracts provided
$5000. The asserted reason for the overage was to permit payment based on perform-
ance measures. Id.; see also Karen Matthews, Hevesi Refuses to Register 17 Workfare
Contracts, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 13, 2000.
59. Steve Schultze, State to Review Firm's Use of W-2 Funds, MILWAUKEE J. SEN-
TINEL, May 10, 2000, at Bi5 (reporting that Wisconsin hired an outside auditor to
investigate whether MAXIMUS overbilled for its welfare reform project); Barrett,
Kleczka Seek Congressional Inquiry of Welfare Services, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL,
Oct. 3, 2000, at B35 (stating that U.S. Reps. Jerry Kleczka and Tom Barrett were
seeking a congressional investigation of privatized welfare services).
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were awarded illegally in 1999.61 Moreover, agency employees
wrote vague requests for services, then failed to ensure that ven-
dors had performed their tasks. 62
One potential avenue for holding government more accountable
might be through taxpayer lawsuits. Standing to sue is premised on
the theory that the contracts are paid for by tax dollars, and that
illegal contracts squander those funds. Many jurisdictions permit
such challenges to the award of public contracts; however, the cus-
tomary requirement that a plaintiff post a bond for the costs of the
litigation 63 renders taxpayer lawsuits as nonstarters for public pol-
icy review prior to the letting of contracts.
C. Context For Contractual-Welfare: Constraints of Women's
Work Amid Concentrated Poverty
1. Concentrated Poverty
Many supporters of welfare-to-work programs proceed from the
premise that recipients freely choose between deviant dependency
and full participation in the workforce. There is a major defect in
this reasoning, namely the growing concentration of poverty in
many welfare-burdened cities. A wealth of social science data indi-
cates that, in important respects, a significant portion of the wel-
fare-reliant population may not be "able" to take the job to which
they are directed by the local welfare office.64 This inability stems
not only from of a lack of "skills," but also from deficiencies that
the simple language of "work ethic" fails to capture-all as the
New Economy beams far beyond the decaying relics of the nine-
teenth century.
The rhetorical and political focus of the Act is on the shortcom-
ings of the welfare parent, understood as personal competencies to
satisfy the economic and developmental needs of her children. Yet
the parent also must face significant factors outside of her personal
60. Carol D. Leonnig, District Audit Finds Illegal, Wasteful Contracting, WASH.
POST, July 29, 2000, at Al (reporting that the District of Columbia illegally awarded
$50 million in welfare-to-work job training contracts in 1999).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Lewis Baker, Procurement Disputes at the State and Local Level.- A
Hodgepodge of Remedies, 25 PUB. CONT. L. J. 265, 291 (1996).
64. In addition to the material presented infra concerning what employers want of
the low-wage workforce, note the burgeoning volume of reports posted to the Welfare
Information Network, http://www.welfarinfo.org. Those reports address barriers such
as: insufficient job skills, inferior healthcare systems for the poor, undiagnosed disa-
bilities, and the consequences of domestic violence, criminal records, or substance
abuse.
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control. Insufficient analysis has been trained on these externali-
ties. The employment infrastructure entails existing labor market
opportunities, including job availability and potential wage rates,
the availability of day care services, the availability of transit op-
tions between home/job/childcare, access to welfare benefits, and
neighborhood resources. A second group of external factors en-
compasses her kinship network: the availability of husband or part-
ner, of family or friends, who can potentially provide time and
resources critical to simultaneous navigation of the employment in-
frastructure, and provision of family care.
a. Ethnographic Characteristics
New research approaches, combining economics, child develop-
ment, and ethnographic perspectives, promise a more complex
analysis of welfare reforms' contribution to the goal of family self-
sufficiency. These results offer bases for translating the complexity
of poor mothers' lived experience into program policy models,65
including key factors for child outcomes such as time spent with the
child and the quality of that interaction.66 Obviously, parenting
quality and time spent with the child are constrained by the par-
ent's level of income, by characteristics of the parent, the availabil-
ity of others to help care for the child (family, friends, the
availability of childcare), as well as a mother's choices as to em-
ployment and welfare.67
Much research about the effects of poverty on family life con-
cludes that poverty impedes both cognitive and social develop-
65. For example, Johns Hopkins University researchers have begun a five-year,
three city study that seeks to correct the narrow focus of economic studies on employ-
ment, welfare, and income, by also incorporating in-depth child development models
and sociological ethnographic study of welfare recipients' social and kinship networks.
PAMELA WINSTON, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV., WELFARE, CH IDREN & FAMILIES: A
THREE CITY STUDY, 1999, available at http://www.jhu.edu/-welfare/-overviewand-
design.pdf. The Three Cities Study melds three time-tested models of qualitative
study in the social sciences, drawing on economic studies, developmental psychology,
and sociological ethnography. The study begins with the widely used "household pro-
duction model," developed by economist Gary Becker in 1965, which conceives of the
family as a unit that attempts to meet multiple goals with limited resources. Id. at 10.
Those goals include material and other aspects of well-being, for both the adults and
the children in the household. Id.
66. Additional key data are the amount of available resources spent on the child,
and characteristics of the interactions between parent and child-for example,
whether in infancy the child experiences her life in a secure and sociable world, or in a
chaotic or unresponsive one. Id. at 12.
67. Id. at 12-13.
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ment.68 Thus, even with work requirements that move mothers off
the welfare rolls, most of those jobs pay wages close to or below
the poverty level. Child development models predict that children
and youth in those homes still will be "disadvantaged" and remain
susceptible to the same harmful processes of poverty that hamper
healthy development.69
Whether mothers facing the welfare work requirements can rely
on social networks, of course, is relevant to the outcomes of wel-
fare reform. The Act, as well as state and local implementation,
frankly, seeks to require poor mothers to lean on these networks
before turning to public assistance.7" In the early 1970s, research
suggested that most low-income African American families faced
the hardships of poverty by relying on effective networks of rela-
tives and friends who shared resources.7' More recent research
shows that many low-income families, including many African
Americans, do not have such strong supportive networks.72 One
recent study found that although single mothers who resided with
kin were more likely to find employment, they did not retain their
jobs longer than mothers who did not live with kin.73
b. Infrastructure Characteristics
Neighborhood characteristics and contexts are an important ele-
ment among the environmental factors that facilitate or constrain
68. "Poverty places stresses on parents that may interfere with parenting. As a
result, it can be more difficult for parents to be warm and engaging, consistent in
discipline, and to provide the stimulation necessary for their children's development."
Id. at 11 (summarizing research in related disciplines).
69. Id. (discussing developmental research on psychological processes that pro-
mote good development even in adversity).
70. The federal statute authorizes states to reduce or eliminate assistance for non-
cooperation in establishing paternity or obtaining child support, 42 U.S.C.
§ 608(a)(2), and forbidsassistance for families that fail to assign to the state any sup-
port rights of any member of the family, id. at § 608(a)(3). Maryland, for example,
requires its FIP program assessment to include identification of the "personal and
family resources available to facilitate independence." MD. ANN. CODE 88A, § 49
(a)(1)(iii) (2000). Furthermore, the agreement between the agency and the recipient
must "require[] the recipient to comply with the reasonable requests for cooperation
by case management workers in seeking and using... family resources that may be
available to recipient." MD. ANN. CODE 88A, § 49 (a)(3)(ii) (emphasis added).
71. The classic work is CAROL STACK, ALL OUR KIN: STRATEGIES FOR SURVIVAL
IN A BLACK COMMUNITY (1974).
72. Lingxin Hao & Mary C. Brinton, Productive Activities and Support Systems of
Single Mothers, 102 AM. J. Soc. 1305-32 (1997); KATHRYN EDIN & LAURA LEIN,
MAKING ENDS MEET: How SINGLE MOTHERS SURVIVE WELFARE AND Low-WAGE
WORK 148-53 (1997).
73. Id.
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welfare recipients' opportunities to obtain and keep jobs. Several
researchers have studied the social isolation that follows the with-
drawal from central cities of employers and the departure of the
middle class. 4 Such neighborhoods are drained of institutional
and social resources-plants in production, small shops, house-
hold-directed services, and bank branches-the community exem-
plars going through the daily ritual of getting to and from work.
These neighborhoods fill with unemployed adults and young peo-
ple and, completing the spiral, the lack of opportunity for gainful
employment stymies the expectations of residents.
Neighborhood quality, including the physical condition of a
neighborhood's schools, housing, and remnant commercial corri-
dors, is important, too. Ethnography incorporates the premise that
such environmental factors shape and constrain behavior, and the
notion that these factors consist simultaneously of material condi-
tions and the manner in which people interpret and understand the
meanings of their society and their place in it.75 Social scientists
continue to debate whether acres of evident public abandonment,
in neighborhoods with the highest concentrations of poverty and
welfare dependence, breed the persistent vulnerability to death
and mayhem experienced there, from guns, fires, addiction, and
despair.76
Welfare caseloads have become predominantly urban, while jobs
and job growth have migrated to the suburbs. At the height of
national welfare rolls in 1994, the one hundred largest U.S. cities
held just under half of all welfare recipients.77 In 1999, this number
flipped, and nearly sixty percent of welfare families lived in these
cities. 78 Even during this, the most sustained economic boom in
U.S history, four out of five American cities have not "staged a
74. E.g., WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF
THE NEW URBAN POOR 25-50 (1997) [hereinafter WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAP-
PEARS; WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY,
THE UNDER CLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1990).
75. WINSTON, supra note 65, at 12.
76. Jeanne Brooks-Gunn et al., Do Neighborhoods Influence Child and Adolescent
Development?, 99 Am. J. Soc. 353, 385 (1993) (examining the impact of neighbors,
both positive and negative, on the development of children).
77. KATHERINE ALLEN & MARIA KIRBY, BROOKINGS INST., UNFINISHED BUSI-
NESS: WHY CITIES MATTER TO WELFARE REFORM 1 (2000), http://
www.brookings.edu/es/urban/welfarecaseloads/2000report.htm.
78. Ten states now account for nearly 70% of the nation's welfare cases: Califor-
nia, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Michigan, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, and
Washington. Id. at 5-6. The same ten states accounted for just 53% of the national
population in 1999. Id. at 6.
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comeback" in job growth in comparison to their suburbs.79 Half of
America's largest central cities had positive employment growth
rates, and still were outpaced by their suburbs.80 In one quarter of
the metropolitan areas examined, the central city's growth rate was
almost stagnant and was far below that of its suburbs.81
Although poverty rates have declined in central cities, urban
poverty rates remain twice those of suburbs.82 Urban neighbor-
hoods in "concentrated poverty"-as defined by the U.S. Census
Bureau, those where at least forty percent of residents are poor-
more than doubled between 1970 and 1990.83
While the economy's engines race toward more knowledge-in-
tensive, white-collar, service-oriented jobs, many of the employ-
ment sectors traditionally rooted in cities are growing slowly, if at
all, including manufacturing, banking, insurance, health care, and
hospitals. Yet people left behind in the central cities' pockets of
concentrated poverty often confront poor schooling and a growing
digital divide, with little preparation to follow into the suburbs or
the New Economy. While nearly two-thirds of suburban children
achieve basic levels of achievement in reading, in high-poverty
neighborhoods, less than one-quarter do. Only one-third of urban
children achieve basic levels in math and science, compared to two-
thirds of suburban school children.84
Welfare reform compels poor mothers to enter the workforce.
But as the work itself moves, how does one break through to em-
ployment? Does the vendored system of work services help or
not? Labor markets do not begin and end at jurisdictional bounda-
ries, and most of the growth in economic activity is regional, not
79. JOHN BRENNAN & EDWARD W. HILL, BROOKINGS INST., WHERE ARE THE
JOBS? CITIES, SUBURBS AND THE COMPETITION FOR EMPLOYMENT 8 (1999), available
at http://www.brookings.edu/es/urban/hillfa.pdf.
80. Id. at 2. The median growth rate was 6%, but some suburbs' rates grew over
30%. Id.
81. Id. Baltimore suffered a job loss of 3.6%, while its suburbs gained by 10%.
Richmond's center lost jobs at a rate of 16.5%, while its suburbs exploded by 27.6%.
Id. at 3, tbl.1. Nearly 20% of the largest central cities nonetheless had positive em-
ployment growth that surpassed their suburbs, and these included some surprises:
Jersey City, New Jersey, Wilmington, Delaware, and even Newark, New Jersey, long
synonymous with urban decline. Id. at 6.
82. Bruce Katz & Katherine Allen, Help Wanted: Connecting Inner City Job Seek-
ers with Suburban Jobs, 17 BROOKINGS REV. 31, 34 (1999), available at http://
www.brook.edu/press/review/fa1199/bkatz.pdf. As of 1997, central cities experienced
poverty at a rate of 18.8%, compared to 9% for suburbs. Id. at 32.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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merely local.85 Yet the structures adopted by states and counties to
implement the Act are so bound. Public job training and
workforce development programs are fragmented by jurisdiction,
and mirror the geographically divided governance of federal and
state programs of assistance such as public and subsidized housing,
eligibility for Food Stamps, health care, and child care assistance.
This territorial character shreds what otherwise might stitch to-
gether a patchwork of family-support services for poor women
transitioning from welfare reliance to workplace reliance by impos-
ing still more hurdles as a condition of reaching opportunities
outside their neighborhoods.86
2. Welfare to Women's Work
The shift to tighten work requirements in welfare policy, imple-
mented aggressively by the states since the 1996 enactment of the
Act, symbolizes a significant change in the nature of the relation-
ship between government and its female welfare clients since the
booming 1980s. The Act reaffirmed the exchange expectation that
recipients would help themselves as a precondition of public assis-
tance, but was enacted, however, at a time of deep national doubt
about the obligations of the state to deliver on its side of the
bargain.
The dramatic shift in welfare policy to require women on welfare
to work in exchange for benefits got its preview in the Family Sup-
port Act of 1988.87 When enacted, the Family Support Act was
hailed as a new national consensus, as "the most sweeping overhaul
85. E.g., H.V. Savitch et al., The Regional City and Public Partnerships, in IN THE
NATIONAL INTEREST: THE 1990 URBAN SUMMIT 69-70 (Ronald Berkham et al. eds.,
1992); Brian Bosworth, Regional Economic Analysis to Support Job Development
Strategies, in JOBS & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 85, 85-104 (Robert P. Giloth ed.,
1998); Elizabeth J. Mueller & Alex Schwartz, Why Local Economic Development and
Employment Training Fails for Low-Income Communities, in JOBS & ECONOMIC DE-
VELOPMENT, 42-60 (Robert P. Giloth ed., 1998); PEGGY CLARK & STEVEN L. DAW-
SON, ASPEN INSTITUTE, JOBS AND THE URBAN POOR: PRIVATELY INITIATED
SECTORAL STRATEGIES 4 (1995); BETH SIEGEL & PETER KWASS, JOBS AND THE UR-
BAN POOR: PUBLICLY INITIATED SECTORAL STRATEGIES 10 (1995).
86. Peter Salsich suggests that the self-sufficiency expected from compliance with
welfare reforms is not feasible without affordable housing. Peter W. Salsich Jr., Wel-
fare Reform: Is Self Sufficiency Feasible without Affordable Housing?, 2 MICH. L. &
POL'Y REV. 43, 69 (1997). Critical housing needs impair the stability and economic
well being of nearly fourteen million Americans, including three million moderate-
income working families. It takes more than one working adult to keep families out of
serious housing stress. Housing America's Working Families, 1 NEW CENTURY HOUS-
ING 1, 1-2 (2000), available at http://www.nhc.org/nhcimages/chprpt.pdf.
87. Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2342 (codified as 42
U.S.C. § 666 (1999)).
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of the nation's welfare system in half a century," 88 and as the re-
definition of the social contract. 89 This profound shift prescribed
reciprocity between government and recipient in the extension of
benefits. In other words, the government would provide income
support in exchange for the recipient's efforts toward self-suffi-
ciency through the employment and training efforts mandated by
the JOBS program created by the Act.9"
The Act's rhetoric links it to Americans' long association of pov-
erty with personal weakness, laziness, or moral deficiency, 91 and
presumes that work promotes self esteem and a sense of responsi-
bility that poor mothers otherwise lack.92 Little serious attention
was paid to the kinds of work likely to be available for welfare
mothers, nor the effect of that work on the physical and mental
health of mother and their families. Politicians also failed to ac-
knowledge significant differences by race in the lives of working
women. These realities include the racial coding of the discourse
that counterfactually presented welfare mothers as overwhelmingly
black,93 as well as the racial segregation of much of the work avail-
88. Irene Lurie & Mary Bryna Sanger, The Family Support Act: Defining the So-
cial Contract in New York, 65 Soc. SERV. REV. 43, 44 (1991).
89. Id. (citing CONG. Q. WKLY REP., Oct. 8, 1988, at 2825); see also, Joel F. Han-
dler, The Transformation of Aid to Families with Dependent Children: The Family
Support Act in Historical Context, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 457 (1987-88)
(discussing the implications of the reform effort for the future of welfare policy).
90. The Act required employable recipients to search for work, or to invest in
their employment prospects through job training, education, or work experience. 42
U.S.C. § 602(a)(19)(A); id. § 682(a)(1)(A). The federal law required states to provide
employment and training services to a minimum portion of employable recipients. Id.
§ 682(a)(1).
91. WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS, supra note 74, at 155-60 (contrasting
American views about poverty and welfare with European views). For a comprehen-
sive critique of TANF's insufficient policy vision for working-poor families, see HARD
LABOR, supra note 2.
92. Requiring work would stop "welfare mothers" from having more babies to
enlarge their benefit check. MARTHA FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEX-
UAL FAMILY, AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 117 (1995) (citing U.S.
Representative Marge Roukema, 113 Cong. Rec. Hl1515 (Dec. 16, 1987)).
93. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, most women on welfare were white. WILSON,
supra note 74, at 166-67. Yet the myth of the "welfare queen" was crystallized by
Ronald Reagan in his 1980 presidential campaign. Reena Shah, The Hidden Faces of
the Hungry, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 14, 1990, at 1A. The sticking power of this
myth perhaps is explained by earlier images of poor black women-headed families as
a component of urban pathology, rendered by the first "Moynihan Report," OFFICE
OF PLANNING & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE NEGRO FAMILY: THE CASE
FOR NATIONAL ACTION (1967), and by the conflagration of race and class in the con-
struction of black stereotypes, e.g., PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, SEEING A COLOUR-BLIND
FUTURE: THE PARADOX OF RACE 31-45 (1998) (arguing that "underclass" is a euphe-
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able to poor mothers, 94 and the racial dimensions of concentrated
poverty, in which people of color are far more likely to be concen-
trated in central cities that cannot provide economic sustenance
and thus substantially limit the life opportunities of their
residents.95
Furthermore, the policy change to "put women to work"
presumes the autonomy and independence of the women who seek
public assistance, as measured by the norms of the market econ-
omy. Although this policy shift appeals to the traditional Ameri-
can notion that a person's value to society is determined by one's
ability to perform paid work, the heightened requirement is imple-
mented at a moment in economic history often called the New
Economy. As workers, women still have not caught up with the
old economy, for they continue to bear disproportionately the ex-
pectations of their families and their governments as presumptive
caregivers, providers of socially essential services that are neither
compensable nor reimbursable. Poor mothers must seek work de-
spite their often-compromised availability for work because of the
demands of caring for dependent children, grandchildren, aged
parents, or disabled family members. For more than sixty years,
AFDC was viewed as a program for the unemployable, 96 and ef-
forts to revamp it to respond to the needs of a changing caseload
mism for blackness, whereas "middle-class" operates as a euphemism for whiteness.
WILLIAMS, supra, at 34-35.
94. Sherrilyn A Ifill, Weaving a Safety New: Women, Work, and Environmental
Justice in the Chicken and Catfish Inductries, 1 MARGINS 23, 32-46 (2001); see also
PUB. JUSTICE CTR., THE DISPOSABLE WORKFORCE: A WORKER'S PERSEPCTIVE
(1998) (discussing the poultry industry, which is ranked among the top five dangerous
occupations, and how white employees have been replaced by African Americans and
immigrant workers), http://www.publicjustice.org/reports/-poultry.pdf.
95. Scholarship detailing the structural links between segregation and poverty in-
clude WILSON, supra note 74; DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERI-
CAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993);
DAVID RUSK, CITIES WITHOUT SUBURBS (1993); PAUL A. JARGOWSKI, POVERTY
AND PLACE: GHETTOS, BARRIOS, AND THE AMERICAN CITY (1997).
96. The able-bodied employable poor were ineligible for assistance. See generally
LESTER M. SALAMON, WELFARE: THE ELUSIVE CONSENSUS 71-73 (1978) (noting the
transition during the Great Depression to supporting employable poor so that they
would remain employable); KATZ, supra note 32; HANDLER, supra note 24. FRANCES
Fox PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR: THE FUNCTIONS OF
PUBLIC WELFARE, 165-75 (2d ed. 1993) (stating that women with children were
thought to be needed at home to accomplish childcare). Cf. America's Working Wo-
men 24-35 (Rosalyn Baxandall et al. eds., 1976) (examining how poor women have
historically had to work outside the home); CARL DEGLER, AT ODDS: WOMEN AND
THE FAMILY IN AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE PRESENT 362-94 (1980)
(noting the growing participation of women in the economy).
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and to shifting economic conditions and social expectations97 have
been awkward and incomplete.98
Poor women today are caught in the crossfire between two shifts
beyond the control of welfare policymakers. On one hand, poor
mothers share in the legacy of the "women's movement," which
fomented tremendous cultural change, for white women in particu-
lar, framed by the premise of women's full autonomy, one piece of
which is workforce participation.99 On the other hand, they remain
relegated to the inadequate preparation and limited entr6e to the
workforce that was the status quo in the 1950s. Welfare policies
profoundly affect the autonomy of women, and always have done
so. The significant changes in the 1980s and 1990s reshaped wel-
fare policies both substantively and ideologically, in ways that fur-
ther mire many poor women. So, although policymakers embrace
autonomy by requiring and directing the workforce participation of
poor women, implementation of the new policies may limit rather
than enhance the ability of welfare recipients to achieve, especially
if careful effort is not taken to attend to the specific needs of wo-
men in the workforce. Otherwise, mandatory work requirements
will tend to perpetuate the gender-based inequities that already ex-
ist in labor markets.100
If local programs are to achieve the work objective of welfare
reform, it is essential to maintain data on real job opportunities: on
their availability, location, employer skill requirements, and pat-
terns of hiring and wage discrimination. Principal findings of one
recent survey of employers' hiring practices suggest a grim climate
for less-educated workers, particularly minority members in central
cities. 1' The few vacant jobs in central cities, compared to sub-
urbs, are mostly in white collar and service occupations, and almost
all of the them require daily reading, writing, arithmetic, computer
use, and/or customer contact, as well as heightened credential re-
97. Myra Bryna Sanger, Welfare Reform within a Changing Context: Redefining the
Terms of the Debate, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 273, 275-77 (1996).
98. KATZ, supra note 32, at 283-87; cf. PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 96, at 123-
45.
99. Ironically, welfare reform has forbidden poor women to be "stay-at-home
moms" just at the historical moment when white middle-class working women have
engaged in much-publicized angst over how to spend more time with their children.
E.g., ANN CRITTENDEN, THE PRICE OF MOTHERHOOD: WHY THE MOST IMPORTANT
JOB IN THE WORLD IS STILL THE LEAST VALUED (2001); Theodore Gideonse,
Mommy Track At the Times, NEWSWEEK, June 1, 1998, at 61.
100. Joanna K. Weinberg, The Dilemma of Welfare Reform: "Workfare" Programs
and Poor Women, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 415, 418-21 (1991).
101. HARRY S. HOLZER, WHAT EMPLOYERS WANT 47-49 (1996).
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quirements, such as job-specific experience, references, or previous
vocational training. 10 2 Hiring screens and task requirements are re-
portedly higher in central cities than in suburbs, even for non-col-
lege jobs.103 Many jobs are filled through informal recruitment
channels, especially by referral from current employees. 10 4 Wage
discrimination continues to limit earnings for minorities, and par-
ticularly for women.10 Such data from the demand side of the la-
bor market necessarily ought to sharpen our government officials'
analysis of welfare-to-work vendors' proffered services. In sum, if
individuals are to escape poverty and the need for public support,
real reform of welfare requires government to face those structures
of the work world.
II. BALTIMORE'S LOCALISM: THE DEVIL'S IN THE DETAILS
Baltimore well illustrates the infrastructure imperative in plan-
ning an effective welfare-to-work policy. Jobs and economic op-
portunity have moved to the suburbs, while poverty worsens in the
center city, which houses sixty percent of Maryland's poor.'0 6 The
median family income for the city was $28,217, compared with
$42,206 for the general metropolitan area.1 0 7 The relevant econ-
omy driving the production and availability of jobs is happening
outside the jurisdiction responsible for getting Baltimore's welfare
recipients into the workforce. The growth economy is in the met-
ropolitan region, which is better able to connect or compete with
other spots around the globe. State and local governments tend to
target their economic development and business recruitment ef-
102. Id.
103. Id. at 54-62.
104. Id. at 49-54; see also, Robert Suggs, Economic Justice in America's Cities: Vi-
sions and Revisions of a Movement Bringing Small Business Development to Urban
Neighborhoods, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 487 (1995) (evaluating the impact of
public procurement programs on small businesses in deteriorated neighborhoods).
105. HOLZER, supra note 102, at 121. For a review of the empirical literature on
declining earnings for less-educated workers, and on growing inequality in earnings
including the gaps between whites and nonwhites and between men and women, see
Frank Levy & Richard Murnane, U.S. Earning Levels and Growing Inequality: A Re-
view of Recent Trends and Proposed Explanations, 30 J. ECON. LIT. 1333, 1333-81
(1992).
106. ALFRED J. KAHN & SHEILA B. KAMERMAN, BIG CITIES IN THE WELFARE
TRANSITION 127 (1998).
107. Id. at 128. The poverty rate is comparatively high at 21.9%, includes a 34.3%
rate for children ages five and younger, and 45.9% for single African American fe-
male heads of household with children. Indicators of child health and well being are
troubling, and the infant mortality rate also remains exceptionally high, at 14.6% per
1000 live births. Id.
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forts on high-tech, knowledge-intensive, and skilled-labor sectors.
Center cities are home to disproportionate and growing shares of
state welfare recipients, and to low-skilled workers, yet are increas-
ingly removed from these new economic opportunities, spatially
and by education and training. In Baltimore, for every entry-level,
low-skill job opening, there are three people looking for that job.10 8
Two of these three jobs are located outside of the city.10 9 Yet Balti-
more is home to seventy-five percent of TANF recipients in the
metropolitan area who are required to work as a condition of eligi-
bility.' 10 At the outset of welfare reform in Maryland, one research
project estimated that of the 14,000 city residents who would need
jobs by 1999 to comply with the twenty-four-month rule, fifty-two
percent would have no high school diploma, twenty-six percent
would have been long-term recipients of cash assistance, and six-
teen percent would have substance abuse problems.'
Whether the welfare agency and its contractors are in fact help-
ing TANF recipients move to work, on penalty of sanctions and the
deepening poverty of their children, are questions of great public
concern. The risk that the public agency may direct TANF recipi-
ents into work activities that count for the state but do not help
parents move to work, makes it imperative to document its policies
and practices, and the results it seeks and obtains as it spends the
state's welfare block grant.
These details of welfare policy delivery are necessary fuel for the
deeply democratic practices of citizen critique, confrontation, ne-
gotiation, and change. Citizen scrutiny is appropriate at three key
junctures that determine the efficacy of the local welfare-to-work
services: (1) the scope and specificity of the city's requests for pro-
posals by private vendors for job-related services; (2) contract
rebid and renewal procedures for vendors; and (3) agency manage-
ment of ongoing contracts. Each is a lens through which to view
the central question of whether vendors are held to expectations
and performance benchmarks appropriate to the policy of moving
people from welfare into sustainable work. In addition, the ac-
countability and democracy problems of contracted welfare ought
to be addressed through enhanced state oversight for the localities'
108. JOB OPPORTUNITIES TASK FORCE, BALTIMORE AREA JOBS AND LoW-SKILL
JOB SEEKERS: ASSESSING THE GAPS 5 (1999), http://www.abell.org/assessing-
the-gap.html. This likely fails to account for all TANF recipients required to work or
be engaged in a work activity. Id.
109. Id. at 4.
110. Id. at 5.
111. KAHN & KAMERMAN, supra note 106, at 140 n.5.
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implementation of welfare reform. To exercise such oversight, the
public requires new tools to aid in the naming and claiming of pub-
lic rights as stakeholders in the use of those targeted funds.
Underscoring the urgency of such oversight is the fact that, to
accomplish the employment objective requires two functions not
within the experience of most welfare agencies: (1) a complex of
services pertaining to work; and (2) planning in coordination with
the needs of the local economy, particularly in declining center cit-
ies. How, if at all, has local welfare administration been revamped
so that the caseworkers' ability to move people from welfare to
work is not obstructed by the external structures of the local econ-
omy? Obvious elements of this agency function include planning
in light of the local and regional unemployment rates, the location
of job opportunities, and the skill levels required for such jobs rela-
tive to the skills and experiences of TANF recipients. One also
must account for projected growth in occupations for which TANF
recipients have or can gain suitable skills, and the wages and hours
available in such occupations that can lead new workers into suffi-
cient earned income to leave welfare behind.1 12
Addressing these barriers is essential to serving TANF recipients
successfully. It is an enormous responsibility for a local welfare
agency to assume, unaided by workforce development profession-
als, and more to the point, absent an intentional relation of wel-
fare-to-work administration with the state's economic development
policies. Baltimore, for example, does not appear to coordinate its
TANF work services with the job development or economic devel-
opment arms of the city or state. In the New Economy, this is a
presumptively dangerous omission, and the perpetuation of yet an-
other bleak economic ghetto, particularly for the residents of the
state's largest city.
Two aspects of conceptualizing government accountability for
TANF job placement services are readily obvious. First, we ought
to expect government to implement its welfare-to-work policy
through agencies and staff having the relevant competencies and
capacity to deliver on the policy objectives. Second, we ought to be
112. Additional infrastructure issues that impose significant barriers to employ-
ment for the poor include the public transit system and the availability of childcare
service providers. Barriers such as these are in no way personal to the TANF recipient
transitioning to work. Even barriers that are personal to a worker in the sense that
they occur in the private sphere of her life-issues such as domestic violence, mental
illness, work-related disabilities, substance abuse, and the dearth of treatment and
support services for workers struggling with these realities-plainly have structural
dimensions which are central to policy planning and the effectiveness of the reforms.
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able to get meaningful review of the performance of the new sys-
tem. One logical source of benchmarks is to compare the local
welfare agency's performance objectives, methods, and outcomes
with the existing world of work placement and job training for low-
income people outside of TANF.
A. TANF Accountability: Review of Vendor Contracts
in Baltimore
The purpose of this article is to audit the local welfare agency's
management of TANF recipients' time-limited opportunity to
leave welfare for work. The first "track" of this study aims to as-
sess the rapid contracting out of employment assistance by the Bal-
timore City Department of Social Services ("BCDSS") to
implement the government "work activity" requirement. 113 The in-
vestigation entails review of the contracts let in 1998, 1999, and
2000 by Baltimore City to an array of vendors, such as America
Works, Goodwill Industries, and local for-profit and not-for-profit
firms and sister agencies, for a set of employment-related services
to TANF applicants and recipients.1 14
An important goal of this project is to hold the local welfare
agency accountable for its management of TANF recipients' lim-
ited opportunity to leave welfare for the rewards of work. The first
stage has consisted of reviewing the requests for proposals
("RFPs") issued by the BCDSS's Family Investment Bureau, be-
ginning in 1997, for direct job placement as well as intensive job
services. This stage also involved a comparison of the contracts'
terms to the RFP provisions for performance assessment. The
RFPs included the requirement of monthly and quarterly reports,
which made the ground appear well-suited for citizen-monitoring
of the manner in which the local welfare agency and its contractual
agents would manage the public fiscal and community stake in
moving Baltimoreans from TANF checks to pay checks.
113. A second track of the study examines "personal responsibility contracts,"
which Baltimore and other local governments in Maryland and throughout the nation
require recipients to sign, indicating the steps that individuals and government agen-
cies will take so that individuals will leave welfare for employment.
114. The first contracts were scheduled to be renewed (or not) during 1999. New
requests for proposals were issued and a few vendors added and dismissed in the
summer of 1999.
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1. A Citizen's Audit
From the citizen-stakeholder's perspective, here is a short list of
fundamental questions that deserve response from the
government.
a. Goals of the Contracting Program
A threshold question, of course, is whether the strategy of con-
tracting out serves appropriate goals. If so, to what extent are
these articulated in the RFP, and specified in the contracts? The
term "appropriate goals" requires development.' 1 5 These would
obviously include those goals of the local government's program,
as stated in the program of the agency charged with implementa-
tion of welfare-reform employment services. But they also should
include goals of the program clients, and the larger community to
be served, on the theory that these are essential stakeholders in
this significant reformulation of the citizen-sovereign compact.
A related inquiry is whether the implementing agency considers
"cross-program" goals, not specifically the subject of the services
sought by this contract, but interactive policies of the same govern-
mental unit, such as a specified percentage reduction in poverty in
an area, community involvement, or of local capacity building.
Minnesota, for example, designed its program expressly to increase
employment and reduce poverty, and independent analysts con-
firm that state's significant success.' 16
b. Implementation of the TANF Work Requirements
Is the state doing its part by providing the necessary services to
help clients leave welfare for work? Are TANF recipients receiv-
115. Analysts and advocates argue that the low-income communities most affected
by the work activity requirement ought to have a consultative role at this stage. E.g.,
THERESA J. FEELEY & SHERI A. BRADY, NAT'L ASS'N OF CHILD ADVOCATES, BE-
YOND DECLINING CASELOADS: ADVOCATES TooLS FOR MONITORING WELFARE RE-
FORM, 1999, http://www.childadvocacy.org/publicat.html. RFP writing is expressly
exempted from federal and local administrative procedure acts. The familiar
processes of notice and comment rulemaking, limited as they often are to ensure
meaningful public participation, are absent here and require alternative vehicles for
transmitting the perspectives of the demos.
116. VIRGINIA KNOX ET AL., MANPOWER DEMONSTRATION RESEARCH CORP., RE-
FORMING WELFARE AND REWARDING WORK: A SUMMARY OF THE FINAL REPORT
ON THE MINNESOTA FAMILY INVESTMENT PROGRAM 2-4 (2000), available at http://
www.mdrc.org/Reports2000/MFIP/MFIPSummary.htm. Notably, Minnesota was
found to have reduced poverty and increased employment for the group considered
key by many policymakers: single-parent long term recipients, who comprise the ma-
jority of the welfare caseload and who are least likely to enter employment on their
own. Id. at 2.
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ing an assessment, adequate in law or fact, which provides the op-
tions and support they need to move successfully to work and to
stay there, in light of the time limits? Are appropriate matches
made to jobs or to employment-related services, and if the latter,
are such services in place, and how well do they serve those seeking
work and the employer base? Are local agencies able to align their
expectations and the actual services for overcoming barriers to em-
ployment? Thus, one branch of the project is scrutiny of the local
governments' use of "personal responsibility contracts."
c. Assessment of the Employment Secured
The employment offered by these services requires both quanti-
tative and qualitative examination. Maryland adopted a "work
first" policy, as have many states, in order to move rapidly into
work the most job-ready welfare recipients. Its caseload has
dropped precipitously, though not as much as those of some other
states. 1 7 Maryland officials are proud that at least fifty percent of
the people who have left welfare can be identified as working in
jobs at least one quarter later.11 8 They say little about the other
fifty percent, except to suggest they left welfare voluntarily. Offi-
cials downplay the fact, but it is evident that a huge number have
disappeared from the rolls without securing work.
d. Goal-Setting
One result of trying to contract for high numbers of job place-
ments can be the pressure on vendors to focus on the easier-to-
serve. If payment is made only as numbers are achieved, does this
preclude smaller community-based organizations from successful
competition because of their relative inability to muster the cash
flow necessary to sustain a contract whose payout is tightly pegged
to performance benchmarks? On the other hand, citizens should
be able to learn whether established vendors are held to some mea-
sure of the promised outcomes) 9
How well is BCDSS setting contract goals? Are they too high or
too low? Do numerical goals undermine such softer goals as equity
117. MD. DEP'T OF HUMAN RESOURCES, STATUS OF CLOSED WELFARE CASES,
1997, http://www.dhr.state.md.us/press/caseclos.htm.
118. Id.
119. The evaluation criteria for the new Welfare-to-Work grants programs include:
(1) entry into unsubsidized employment; (2) six-month retention in unsubsidized em-
ployment; (3) six months of earnings in unsubsidized employment; and (4) attainment
of educational or occupational credential by participants who entered unsubsidized
employment.
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in the provision of services, of avoiding segregated employment
patterns in placements, in the utility of the services to clients, or
capacity building for local contractors? To the extent the contracts
reflect "partnership" approaches, in which the state offers signifi-
cant technical assistance and information during the term to facili-
tate success, as distinguished from old-fashioned compliance
monitoring, is this model productive?
e. Contract Renewal and Rebid Decisions
When discussing renewal and rebid decisions, it is important to
know who conducts the review of performance and evaluative
data, by what standards, and how those reporting requirements are
implemented. Some situations may, in fact, call for less stringent
review. For example, when contracts are granted to pilot projects
or to smaller, community-based organizations with one goal being
capacity-building, ought more forgiving renewal terms apply than
to larger contracts? What has been local experience with this
approach?120
In the era of contractualization, what role do agency staff retain
for operating the new welfare agency within the framework created
by the private vendor contracts? Furthermore, what training do
they receive in the management of these contracts?
Qualitatively, the policy of the Act directs that jobs to which the
new services lead should be assessed for their ability to promote
self-sufficiency through work. Self-sufficiency is a concept amena-
ble to serious debate, but in the workforce development field, it is
common to find progress toward that goal measured in terms of
access, retention, earnings, and benefits. In Maryland, as in much
of the nation, of the welfare-leavers who are working, the newest
data suggest that much of the work after welfare pays less than the
poverty level, is highly contingent, and without benefits.' 2'
120. A useful primer on the issue of performance evaluation is JESSICA YATES,
MANAGING THE CONTRACTING PROCESS FOR RESULTS IN WELFARE REFORM (1998),
at http://www.welfareinfo.org/contractissue.htm. Yates outlines the background con-
cerns when deciding to renew or rebid contracts. She concludes by discussing how
several states and municipalities have addressed the problem, including Pennsylvania;
Broward County, Florida; Fairfax County, Virginia; Indiana; Delaware; and
Wisconsin.
121. E.g., UNIV. OF MD. SCH. OF SOC. WORK, LIFE AFTER WELFARE: AN INTERIM
REPORT 26 (1997) (reporting that 58% of leavers earned wages reported in state ad-
ministrative systems, and average earnings for 1996 were $4,818; half earned less than
$3,041); UNIV. OF MD. SCH. OF SOC. WORK, LIFE AFTER WELFARE: THIRD INTERIM
REPORT 41-45 (1999) (reporting the top twenty employment categories of Maryland's
welfare leavers, and raising the question whether these jobs will pay enough for them
2001] 1587
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JO URNAL[Vol. XXVIII
f Evaluation of Contract Performance
Government review of service vendor performance also requires
close scrutiny. How is the private contractor held accountable for
compliance, performance, and outcomes? To what extent is the lo-
cal agency serving the citizens by careful contracting, properly
measuring vendors' performance, and making renewal and rebid
decisions in line with suitable measures? The use of performance
measures and incentives, including pay-for-performance, is one of
the potentially important tools in the privatization kit.
2. Existing Models for Government Accountability in Local
Government Contracts for Employment Services
One measure of local government's accountability is the availa-
bility of responsible benchmarks and contract management prac-
tices for the effectiveness of the job services required of TANF
recipients. Congress relied upon performance-based management
principles in aspects of the TANF statute, reinforcing the work par-
ticipation requirements with a system to award bonuses to "high-
performing States,' 122 defined to mean states that are most success-
ful in achieving the four purposes of the TANF program.1 23 In ad-
dition, two major initiatives were launched-the Department of
Labor's Welfare-to-Work 24 bonus program ("WtW") and the
to support their families and avoid a return to the welfare rolls); see also SHARON
PARROTT-, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, WELFARE RECIPIENTS WHO
FIND JOBs: WHAT Do WE KNOW ABOUT THEIR EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS? 9-12,
1998, available at http://www.cbpp.org/11-16-98wel.pdf. This study found that many
former welfare recipients who have found employment earn salaries that place them
well below the poverty line.
122. 42 U.S.C. § 603(a)(4) (1999). Bonus awards for TANF performance were
based on four work measures: the job entry rate, the duration of job placements,
earnings increase, and "such other factors as the Secretary of Labor deems appropri-
ate .... " Id. § 603(a)(E)(iii).
123. Four principal goals shape the statute that emerged from deeply contentious,
hard-fought, sharply partisan political effort. These are: (1) providing assistance to
families so that children will be cared for in their family's home; (2) ending depen-
dence on government assistance by promoting work, job preparation, and marriage;
(3) preventing and reducing out-of-wedlock births; and (4) encouraging the formation
and maintenance of two-parent families. § 601(a). For a balanced history of the con-
tending policies ultimately melded into the Act, see TIMOTHY J. CONLAN, FROM NEW
FEDERALISM TO DEVOLUTION, at ch.13 (1998).
124. The bonus program was authorized by the Balanced BudgetAct of 1997, Pub.
L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251. For a discussion of these funds, which are targeted at
creating opportunities for those TANF recipients who are hardest to employ, see
Kathryn R. Lang, Fair Work, Not Workfare: Examining the Role of Subsidized Jobs in
Fulfilling States' Work Requirements Under the Personal Responsibility and Work Rec-
onciliation Act of 1996, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 959, 982-83 (1998).
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Workforce Investment Act of 1998 ("WIA") -2 5-each designed to
include meaningful benchmarks and outcome evaluation, thereby
suggesting a serious concern for their effectiveness as workforce
development programs.
The Department of Labor's WtW was first authorized in 1997 to
award $3 billion in grants to states and local communities, on a
competitive basis, to promote job opportunities and employment
preparation for the hardest-to-employ recipients of cash assistance
and for non-custodial parents of children on TANF.126 Evaluation
criteria include: (1) entry into unsubsidized employment; (2) six-
month retention in unsubsidized employment; (3) six months of
earnings in unsubsidized employment; and (4) attainment of educa-
tional or occupational credentials by participants who entered un-
subsidized employment.127 Independent evaluation, conducted by
Mathematica Policy Research, Inc. and its subcontractors, the Ur-
ban Institute and Support Services International, Inc., is intended
to answer specified questions, including: What are the net impacts
of the WtW approaches on employment, and on families' well-be-
ing? What challenges do the grantees face as they implement and
operate WtW? How well do the Private Industry Councils and
other non-TANF organizations (the primary vehicles for funding
and operating WtW programs) meet the challenge of serving the
hardest-to-employ? 128
An additional benchmark of government accountability for the
TANF job placement services could be a comparison of the world
of work placement and job training for poor/low income people
outside of TANF. The WIA prescribed a major national upgrade
of the field of public workforce development, representing a new
national policy consensus that human resources are our most pre-
125. 29 U.S.C. § 2801 (2000); infra note 129 and accompanying text.
126. Welfare Reform: States' Implementation and Effects on the Workforce Develop-
ment System: Testimony Before the House Subcomm. on Postsecondary Educ. Train-
ing, and Life-Long Learning, Comm. on Educ. and the Workforce, 106th Cong. 3-4
(1999) (statement of Cynthia M. Fagnoni, Director, Education Workforce and Income
Security Issues, Health, Education, and Human Services Division). Grants are
awarded by the Dep't of Labor to local communities with innovative welfare-to-work
approaches on a competitive basis, and through states on a formula basis to the Pri-
vate Industry Councils or equivalent bodies in the service delivery areas of the Job
Training Partnership Act, Pub. L. No. 97-300, 96 Stat. 1332 (1982), now subsumed by
the Workforce Investment Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-220, 112 Stat. 936 (1998).
127. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services is evaluating the effec-
tiveness of welfare-to-work initiatives, in conjunction with the Departments of Labor
and Housing and Urban Development.
128. A wealth of information about the grants program, and WtW in general, is
posted by the Employment and Training Administration at http://wtw.doleta.gov.
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cious national assets.129 Its Evaluation Task Force recommended
twenty-four performance measures. 3 °
Furthermore, although the Act does not require states to de-
velop or use client-based outcome measures, many states have con-
tracted for an array of studies and other services, which may help
them understand the outcomes of their programs. Maryland's Ad-
ministration for Children and Families ("ACF") retains oversight
responsibilities, and is obligated to provide an annual report to
Congress on TANF. Thus in 1997, ACF issued regulations to ad-
dress the data collection and reporting provisions, measures of
state performance under the work participation requirement, and
the assessment of penalties for performance failures under
TANF. 31' The agency funded evaluations in several states to assess
reforms begun under waivers. The Assistant Secretary for Plan-
ning and Evaluation ("ASPE") also has sought to evaluate the im-
pact of welfare reform on child well-being, by requiring annual
reports of state child poverty rates in relation to the TANF pro-
gram, 1 32 and to fund studies of outcomes for families diverted from
or leaving TANF.
Most states are planning or have begun to conduct evaluations
examining the outcomes of their state TANF programs for families
129. The WIA is the most significant reform of the national job training system in
fifteen years. Its statutory purpose is to improve the quality of the workforce and
reduce welfare dependency by supporting and directing the investment of statewide
and local workforce systems intended to increase the employment, job retention,
earnings, and occupational skill of participants. 29 U.S.C. § 2811 (1999). The WIA
establishes a system of "one-stop delivery" sites for access to employment-related and
training services, id. § 2864(c), and requires the participation of more than twenty
"partner" programs authorized under this and prior federal statutes pertaining to
work. Id. § 2841(b). WtW programs are required to participate; TANF may be linked,
but this is not required. The state must establish a State Workforce Investment Board,
Id. § 2821(a), which develops the state plan, and submits a five-year strategic plan to
the Department of Labor. State plans must specify how the state will implement key
requirements of the WIA, and how special populations, including welfare recipients,
veterans and persons with multiple barriers to employment, will be served. Id.
§ 2822(b).
Local planning and state oversight are required for "workforce development," un-
like TANF welfare-work programs. Planning and oversight of local implementation is
by a Local Workforce Investment Board, appointed by local elected officials; local
plans are then subject to approval by the governor. Id. § 2832(a)-(b).
Like the Act, the WIA makes funding available to states contingent upon satisfac-
tory levels of performance, according to specified indicators.
130. WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT PERFORMANCE MEASURES: MENU AT A
GLANCE, at http://www.wdsc.org/transition/measure/append-d.htm (Mar. 1999).
131. Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, 64 Fed. Reg. 17,720, 17,722 (Apr.
12, 1999) (to be codified at 5 C.F.R. pts. 260-265).
132. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 63 Fed. Reg. 50,837 (Sept. 23, 1998).
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and children.'33 The central utility of such evaluations surely is to
inform citizens and policymakers about the effects of the policy
judgments implemented in one's jurisdiction. Three years into wel-
fare reform, few states' evaluations had produced even an interim
report.134
Neither the prevalence of performance-based evaluation of pro-
grams tailored to the employment-related needs and services for
welfare recipients, nor the policy commitments to alleviate poverty
through public expenditures for work activity required under the
Act, need penetrate to the streets where welfare mothers live,
work, and raise their children. These federal efforts all stand in
remarkable contrast to the city-run and state-approved system for
moving people from welfare to work, and sanctioning them for
non-work, in the City of Baltimore.
B. Baltimore's Vendor Contracts for TANF Job Services
Following passage of TANF and of Maryland's implementing
legislation in 1996, Baltimore had more than two years to plan its
program of welfare-to-work services before its resident recipients
would meet the twenty-four-month limit, which required participa-
tion in an approved work activity on January 1, 1999. The City
promulgated its Family Investment Program ("FIP")135 in 1996 and
requests for proposals for employment-related services in 1997,
1998, and 1999. Twenty-nine contracts have been let to twenty ven-
dors, committing the City to pay some $64 million for the vendors'
services. What scope of services, quality of service, and program
outcomes, have the contracts secured?
1. The Local Plan: Baltimore City's FIP
Since its inception in 1996, the primary objective of Baltimore
City's FIP "is to assist the customer to become self-sufficient,"
133. State evaluations vary greatly in scope and in methodological rigor. They
range from simple one-time surveys of a single policy to longitudinal studies that track
multiple cohorts of clients on a variety of outcomes. Only twelve states are using an
experimental design using control groups, which can establish causal relationships be-
tween program features and client outcomes. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T
OF HEATH & HUMAN SERVS., EARLY EFFORTS BY STATES TO MONITOR OUTCOMES
OF WELFARE REFORM, Pub. No. OE1-03-98-00130 (1999) available at http://
searchpdf.adobe.com/proxies/1/71/32/28.html.
134. Id.
135. FAMILY INVESTMENT PLAN FOR BALTIMORE 5.1 (1996) [hereinafter FIP]. To
achieve the goal of helping families become more independent, the Maryland Depart-
mentt of Human Resources ("DHR") transferred "greater flexibility, authority, and
accountability to the Local Departments of Social Services." Id. at 1.1.
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through placement in various work-related activities that lead to
permanent employment.'36 In April 1997, proposals were sought
for Direct Job Placement Program Services. Two years into Mary-
land's implementation of TANF, Baltimore's revised Plan ex-
plained that it "triaged" its TANF customers into three work
categories-"Job Ready," "Hard-to-Place," and "Severely Chal-
lenged. 1 37 Job Ready customers are those deemed "able to
achieve full-time employment with current job programs."'1 38 Indi-
viduals who have not secured jobs by those means are classified as
Hard-to-Place. The variety of personal and family challenges faced
by these customers presumably led to the issuance of the RFP for
Coordinated/Supportive Work Preparation and Placement Services
in 1999, intended to move persons with these needs "into full-time
unsubsidized employment. 1 139 The Severely Challenged customers
are so categorized based on multiple problems prohibiting them
from fulfilling basic functions of daily living, including chronic sub-
stance abuse, domestic violence, histories of child abuse or neglect,
and physical and/or mental health problems severe enough to pose
a major barrier to employment, although not so severe as to consti-
tute a disability.4n The City also solicited proposals and let con-
tracts for Intensive Family Support Services, to provide
comprehensive family interventions for these severely challenged
applicants. Vendors were to be contractually obligated to provide
services from initial contact until the adult family member is em-
ployed for six months, and job retention support services for six
months beyond that.' 4'
136. Id. at 5.1.
137. BALT. CITY DEP'T OF Soc. SERVS., FAMILY INVESTMENT PROGRAM IN Ac-
TION 6 (1999) [hereinafter BCDSS, FIPA]. TWo years later, the City modulated this
objective somewhat, stating that one of three primary goals is "to move families to-
ward economic self-sufficiency through adult household members obtaining and re-
taining employment, or some other source of income." Id. at 2.
.138. Available programs include job resource labs, job readiness programs, and
support services such as transportation, childcare, medical assistance, and emergency
services. These are accessible through the Employment Opportunity Resource Labs
in each Family Investment Center. Id. at 6.
139. Id. at 6-7. The City Plan claims that vendors contracted to provide coordi-
nated/supportive services must provide outreach, case management, job retention,
and post-employment services. Id. at 7-8. The RFP for Direct Job Placement similarly
states that the purpose is to place customers into full-time unsubsidized employment.
Balt. City Dep't of Soc. Servs., Request for Proposal(s) for Direct Job Placement
Program Services, BCDSS/IMA-97/015-S, at 1.1 (1997).
140. BCDSS, FIPA, supra note 137, at 6-7. A person identified as disabled is enti-
tled to exemption from the TANF work activity requirements.
141. BCDSS, FIPA, supra note 137, at 7.
1592
THE CONTRACTUAL WELFARE STATE
a. Characteristics of Baltimore's TANF Program
State law requires that each applicant for cash assistance and
other Family Investment benefits be assessed to determine what
she needs to achieve independence.142 A work assessment is re
quired for each Temporary Cash Assistance ("TCA") recipient
adult or minor parent. This is the task of the case manager, and
state regulations provide limited guidance for the assessment. 143
Eligibility is conditioned upon compliance with employment re-
quirements, unless an individual is exempt by reason of severe dis-
ability, youth, care for a young child, or working at least thirty
hours a week at minimum wage or higher. 144 Maryland law com-
mands participation, but the local departments approve particular
work activities. 45 Recipients found to face "no barriers" to partici-
pation in work activities are referred to a vendor under contract
with the local department. 146 If the adult does not comply with the
142. MD. ANN. CODE 88A, § 49(a)(1) (2000). An assessment shall consider the ap-
plicant or recipient's reasons for reliance on public assistance, personal and family
resources available to the individual, and her "educational level, job skills and readi-
ness, and interest to evaluate appropriate work activities." Id.
143. TCA is a component of the FIP that provides cash assistance to needy families
with dependent children. FAMILY INV. ADMIN, MD. DEP'T OF HUMAN RES., PUBLIC
ASSISTANCE: TEMPORARY CASH ASSIASTANCE, http://www.dhr.state.md.us/fia/-
p_assist.htm. The assessment consists of review of the customer's education level,
work history, skills, interests and the number of months that s/he has received cash
assistance. The case manager also explores whether there are "any barriers" to em-
ployment. The information so assembled is to be used to write an Independence Plan
of action to move the recipient from welfare to work. SOP 99-12 (Aug. 1, 1999). Be-
cause the Plan must specify the work activities required of the recipient, and the spe-
cific supportive services that the local department will provide to meet the recipient's
obligations, MD. ANN. CODE 88A, § 49(a)(3) (2000), the assessment must precede the
formulation of the Plan. However, in 1998, TANF recipients in Baltimore were re-
quired to sign Plans in blank. Even after advocates discovered the practice, it remains
the case the customers are required to sign the Independence plan before the assess-
ment has been completed. FAMILY INV. PROGRAM LEGAL CLINIC, TIME OUT! A
STATUS REPORT ON WELFARE REFORM IN BALTIMORE CITY AT THE THREE YEAR
MARK, AS EXPERIENCED BY THOSE IT WAS INTENDED TO HELP AND THEIR LEGAL
ADVOCATES 10 (1999) [hereinafter TIMEOUT!], http://www.law.-umaryland.edu/
faculty/czapanskiy.asp. One problem with this timetable is that Independence Plans
are executed before the recipient and case manager have discussed the availability
and suitability of the work-services vendors. Id.
144. MD. REGS. CODE, tit. 7, § 07.03.03.07(l)(2) (2000).
145. MD. REGS. CODE, tit. 7, § 07.03.03.07(J)(1)(a) (2000).
146. SOP 99-12 (Aug. 1, 1999).
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work requirements, 47 without good cause, 48 the entire family is
sanctioned and ineligible for cash assistance. 149
b. Scant Planning for Outcomes.
The original statement of program objectives was modest and
stated with little specificity. BCDSS hoped to achieve 4000 job
placements. 50 The agency reported that approximately half of FIP
customers had a high school diploma or GED. No baseline was
presented concerning the length of time of cash assistance, or num-
bers facing other barriers to sustained employment. Even two
years into the new employment focus, when the local FIP plan was
revised in 1999, the agency still offered no data or estimate of the
target numbers of customers in each triage cohort to be served.' 5 1
Indeed, although information about an individual's literacy level is
essential to assessment and suitable placement with a vendor,
BCDSS waited two years before it included any assessment of liter-
acy level or needs in its assessment.'52
The revised Plan appeared to make provision for 5000 recipi-
ents.153 The agency estimated that 1500 Job Ready customers
147. Noncompliance is not defined in the provision for sanction for noncompliance,
MD. REGS. CODE, tit. 7, § 07.03.03.15C (2000).
148. Good cause for refusing or failing to cooperate with work requirements in-
cludes properly documented illness or incapacity, court-required appearance or incar-
ceration, family crisis including domestic violence, a breakdown in transportation
arrangements, a breakdown in child care arrangements or lack of child care resources,
lack of supportive services defined in the initial assessment and independence plan, or
an assignment to a work activity that would require a parent or child caretaker pro-
viding care for a child younger than one year, to work more than thirty hours per
week. MD. REGS. CODE, tit. 7, § 07.03.03.07(I)(6) (2000).
149. A recipient who disagrees with the local department's decision to refer to a
work program, with the disposition in a conciliation process, or with a decision to
sanction the recipient, may request a fair hearing before an administrative law judge.
MD. REGS. CODE, tit. 7, § 07.01.04.03(B) (2000). Although formally available, admin-
istrative appeals often are impeded by City practices. TIMEOUT!, supra note 143, at
31-33. Agency staff routinely refuse to accept requests for appeals, refuse to provide
appeals forms, and push customers into settlement conferences with supervisors.
TIMEOUT!, supra note 143, at 32. Administrative law judges practice a "Catch-22";
they merely remand a contested matter to the agency for unspecified "corrective ac-
tion," leaving the agency free to take the same action again. The judge's response-
file another appeal. TIMEOUT!, supra note 143, at 33.
150. FIP, supra note 135, at 5.1.
151. Nor was any mention made of the proportions of its caseload that might be
exempt from the work requirements, or in need of particularized services, due to disa-
bility, caring for a young child, or the recipient's youth.
152. TIMEOUT!, supra note 143, at 11-12.
153. The first families hit twenty-four months on January 1, 1999, and then required
assessment and referral to a work activity. BCDSS projected that 10,040 families
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would use existing support services to seek employment. Twenty
percent were expected to succeed in finding full-time unsubsidized
employment. 154 No further outcomes were stated for this group's
job retention, duration, wages or benefits.
Some 3000 Hard-to-Place recipients were to be served by a new
RFP for Coordinated/Supportive Work Preparation and Placement
Services, issued in 1999. Outcomes projected that ninety percent,
or 2700, would be placed in a job during the contract term, and that
at least fifty percent would achieve full-time unsubsidized employ-
ment for six months.155
The FY 2000 Plan included a heightened obligation for vendors
to provide more extensive outreach services, to improve the enroll-
ment rates for customers who otherwise fail to attend initial ap-
pointments, 56 and to integrate job retention strategies with job
placement services. 57 To that end, all of the welfare-to-work con-
tracts with new vendors were to include "goals and/or pay incen-
tives" for the vendor to assist the customer to stay employed.
Further policy developments, not explicitly linked to the out-
comes expected under the vendor contracts, were announced to
address the barriers of illiteracy, transportation, and childcare in
1999. Asserting that the single most significant predictor of a
child's educational success is the educational level of the child's
mother, the City targeted "the intergenerational cycle of educa-
tional failure" as closely associated with the cycle of welfare depen-
dency.158 Recognizing the cost of transit as a hindrance to job
retention, the City announced plans for a pilot program allowing
any transitional recipient who finds a job outside the City to qualify
would reach the twenty-four-month mark in FY 2000. It estimated a 30% reduction
by the end of FY 2000. BCDSS, FIPA, supra note 137 at 22.
154. Id. at 7.
155. The City also anticipated that at least 500 families would require intensive
services in order to prepare for placement or referral to a work activity. Thus a sepa-
rate RFP was issued for these services. The Plan projected that 90% of the adult
family members would be "ready to be referred or placed in work activity" within
time frames specified in each individual's case plan. Id.
156. Id. The FY 2000 Plan announced additional innovations in the works: it was
developing programs to engage non-custodial parents in work activities and family
life; pre-service and in-service training for relative caretakers; and family literacy
programs.
157. Two new programs facilitated the combination of job retention and placement
services. The Post Employment Partners Program ("PEPP") provides supportive re-
tention services to employees, and the Baltimore Employment Exchange ("BEE")
affords job retention services to potential employers, thereby creating incentive to
hire customers receiving temporary cash assistance. Id.
158. Id. at 13.
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for the maximum childcare subsidy, regardless of income, for the
first six months of employment. 159 The BCDSS, in response to wel-
fare-to-work vendors' reports that a lack of evening, sick-child, and
overnight childcare impeded employment, committed to study the
need for such care and to create a flexible fund to address that
need.
c. Adding Up the Numbers.
Baltimore's revised FIP Plan is one source of data with which to
evaluate the efficacy of the City's vendor system for work services,
specifically for those contracts let in the first three years of
TANF 6 ° The City projected that, of the more than 10,000 families
that would hit the twenty-four-month limit requiring their work
participation, only 2700 would be "placed in jobs," and of these,
only 1350 would retain employment for as long as six months. 1
An additional 300 individuals were expected to find work because
they were directed to look for it.1 62 All told, then, Baltimore ex-
pects fewer than 1.700 individual recipients actually will leave wel-
fare for work.
2. The Welfare-to-Work Services Contracted For by Baltimore
City: Not "Leading to Sustained Employment"
a. Requests for Proposals
At first blush, Baltimore's welfare-to-work RFPs appear to pro-
vide important accountability tools, in that they require monthly
and quarterly reports to maintain relevant benchmarks. Direct Job
Placement vendors were notified of monthly deliverables-to in-
clude the hourly wage for placements, the number of jobs secured
with and without benefits, and the number of persons placed in
full-time unsubsidized employment or enrolled in other work activ-
ities (by type). 63 As is customarily provided, failure to deliver
could result in possible termination of the multi-year contract.
159. Thereafter, the recipient is expected to apply for the Earned Income Tax
Credit, to defray some of the expenses of retaining a job with a city-county commute.
Id.
160. This is certainly the case in the absence of other professional evaluation
studies.
161. Id. at 7, 22.
162. Id.
163. Bait. City Dep't Soc. Servs., Request for Proposals for Direct Job Placement
Program Services, BCDSS/IMA-97/015-S, at 3.7 (1997) [hereinafter Request for
Proposals].
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In other important respects, however, the RFPs provided little
guidance to offerors about the City's needs or requirements. The
furious embrace of performance-based contracting for social ser-
vices at the federal level, and in many other states, appears not to
have penetrated to this local government, where the five-year clock
is ticking for local residents.
RFPs are perhaps the most common method for governments to
purchase professional services. A comprehensive specification of
services is a regular feature of the RFP method, although not uni-
versal, since prospective contractors often are encouraged to de-
velop their own approaches.164 The quality of the service
specification is recognized as a critical ingredient of effective con-
tracting. Local government can set guidelines for vendors by speci-
fying: (1) resources needed for the task-for example, the number
and qualifications of personnel needed for the job and the number
of clients to be assisted; (2) descriptions of the processes and tasks;
and (3) performance that is considered satisfactory. 165
Baltimore's RFP for direct job placement specified some
processes and outcomes. Thoses processes included placing appli-
cants into full-time unsubsidized employment, providing job readi-
ness and job search training, developing job and career training
specifically for welfare recipients, and providing six months of
post-placement follow-up for those applicants placed in full-time
unsubsidized employment.1 66 Prescribed outcomes suggested a
higher level of expectation than that signaled in the City's FIP: at
least 75% of all referred recipients would find full-time employ-
ment; 90% of those placed will remain employed for at least thir-
teen weeks, and 85% for twenty-six weeks following placement.167
Payment was to turn on the four pay-out points indicated by the
outcome measures: 20% upon referral to the vendor; an additional
30% upon placement into unsubsidized employment; 20% more
for each individual who retains employment for at least thirteen
weeks, earning at the higher of the TANF eligibility amount or the
minimum wage; and the remaining 30% for each individual em-
ployed at least twenty-six weeks.' 68
164. KEVIN LAVERY, SMART CONTRACTING FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICES
63 (1999).
165. Id. at 66.
166. Request for Proposals, supra note 163, at 3.3.
167. Id.
168. Id. at $ 2.15.
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Aside from the incentives inherent in the pay-out points, the de-
tails await vendors' design. The balance of the specification section
lists the dozen aspects of implementation that each vendor is to
describe in its proposal. 169 Those features include the employment
services to be provided and the data the vendor will collect, includ-
ing its intended means of tracking attendance and maintaining
records of participants' employment. 7 ' The RFP makes a faint ef-
fort at requiring offerors to consider the labor market in which
their employment services would be provided. Specifically, the
City asked vendors to identify the occupations that TANF recipi-
ents are "most likely" to obtain after the vendor's program, as well
as some evidence that the labor market in the Baltimore metropol-
itan area will support the potential services the vendor proposes. 171
One effect of this form of RFP is that the City waited to learn
from the offerors such key parameters as: the number of individu-
als to be served; the number who would be aided by job place-
ments or some intermediate spot on the continuum from welfare to
paycheck; and what the vendor-dependent program would in fact
cost the taxpayers. The RFP asked offerors to estimate the total
number of persons they expected to serve in the twenty-five-month
contract period, and to submit a budget, projecting monthly enroll-
ments, job placements, other work-related activities, or work expe-
rience placements. 72
The Baltimore RFPs delegated significant aspects of program
design to the vendors. One result is that vendors' programs vary
enormously. A further result is that, absent either effective pro-
gram prescription or contract management, the local government is
not in the driver's seat for its policy or service delivery. Rather,
local government is acting in derogation of the responsibilities de-
volved to it by the state.
3. The Contracts
The contracts provide a discouraging portrait of the City's com-
mitments to its neediest citizens' employment needs, and raise
large questions about the value added by the vendor contracts.
The contracts propose service for too few, aim for quite limited
employment outcomes, and for those few contracts expressly con-
nected to real job openings, engage in creaming. The bulk of ven-
169. Id. at J$ 3.1-3.1.1
170. Id. at 3.4.
171. Id. at 3.4(8).
172. Id. at 3.4(10).
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dors paid under the "direct job placement" RFP, in fact, promise
less than job placement for most welfare recipients. Thus, most of
Baltimore's expenditure for welfare-to-work services is made with-
out the apparent expectation that referral to vendors will lead most
welfare recipients to employment success and independence from
welfare.
As of January 1999, some 9700 people in Baltimore hit the
twenty-four-month mark and nearly all needed to be in work activ-
ities. 173 The number of jobs created and placements planned under
Baltimore's strategy of contractualization could provide employ-
ment for only one-quarter of that number.
The vacuity of expected outcomes is evident from the vendors'
program proposals. Ten vendor programs variously aim for cus-
tomers to "become employed," "move to work experience," or "to
be employed. ' 174 Six vendors got contracts for programs the atten-
173. JOB OPPORTUNITIES TASK FORCE, BALTIMORE AREA JOBS AND Low-SKILL
JOB SEEKERS: ASSESSING THE GAPS 31-33 (1999) [hereinafter ASSESSING THE GAPS].
An overview of employment projections in Baltimore City and the greater metropoli-
tan area paints a changing picture of the job market. For example, the region's em-
ployment growth over the next decade will be centered on the wholesale trade, retail
trade, finance-insurance-real estate, and service sectors; however, Baltimore City is
predicted to experience declines in each of these sectors. Id.
Examination of the jobs themselves further explains Baltimore City's plight. Ac-
cording to the Job Opportunities Task Force, sixty-two percent of employment in the
Baltimore metropolitan region was in positions defined as low-skill. Id. Unfortunately
for urban residents, two out of three of those jobs were located outside of Baltimore
City. Id.
Finally, comparing the number of unemployed individuals to the number of jobs
completes this dreary picture. On an average day in 1999, there were 76,700 individu-
als seeking 26,500 full-time, low-skill jobs in the Balitmore metropolitan region-ap-
proximately a 3-to-1 ratio. Id. at 32. In Baltimore City, however, there were 27,500
individuals seeking 8950 full-time, low-skilled jobs-also a 3-to-1 ratio. Id.
The near future does not appear any brighter for the region. According to the
Greater Baltimore State of the Region report, issued by the Greater Balitimore Com-
mittee and the Greater Baltimore Alliance in 1998, "Baltimore ranked last out of
twenty comparable regions in terms of job growth between 1992 and 1996." Id. at 33.
In short, Baltimore's rate of job growth fails to create sufficient employment for its
residents. Id.
174. E.g., GRANT AGREEMENT BETWEEN BALTIMORE CITY DEP'T OF Soc. SERVS.
& BALTIMORE GOODWILL INDUS., FOR HOSPITALITY TRAINING AND PLACEMENT
SERVS. app.A (1997) ("After the two week job readiness training an individual can
either become employed immediately or receive on the job training.") [hereinafter
BGI AGREEMENT]; INTERAGENCY AGREEMENT BETWEEN BALTIMORE CITY DEP'T
OF SOC. SERVS. & BALTIMORE CITY HEAD START, FOR JOB SEARCH/WORK EXPERI-
ENCE PROGRAM SERVS. app.A (1996) [hereinafter HEAD START AGREEMENT] ("If a
customer has not secured a job by the end of the 8 weeks [of training] he/she will have
the opportunity to move to work experience."); GRANT AGREEMENT BETWEEN BAL-
TIMORE CITY DEP'T OF Soc. SERVS. & THE CHIMES, FOR JOB TRAINING AND PLACE-
MENT SERVS. app.A (1997) [hereinafter CHIMES AGREEMENT] ("The total of their
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uated relation to employment of which included the number to "be
enrolled," to "complete a career plan," or to "be served." The ab-
sence of definitions, and of government-selected performance
benchmarks, renders the count nearly meaningless. For example,
one vendor projected 600 individuals to "receive employment,"
then cautions that 450 of these will "retain employment for at least
7 days. 175
The prototypes of a value-adding vendor are: (1) contracted
training with an employer who will hire successful completers, and
(2) training that leads to a credential in an occupation likely to
have recurring vacancies. Several vendors were funded to provide
job training for specific occupational destinations in the service sec-
tor, widely thought to offer the most employment opportunity for
low-skilled, less educated women. Vendors made no promises that
successful trainees would receive job offers, however. For exam-
ple, Baltimore Goodwill Industries was contracted to train seventy
people for positions as "house person, room attendant, utility stew-
ard, [or] salad pantry. ' 176 It opined, without committing, that it
expected the Omni Hotel, site of its training program, to "hire our
customers if a position is available during the initial pilot phase of
this project. 177
Three vendors claimed that they would train recipients suffi-
ciently to permit them to gain a credential. 178 A local community
college said that it would offer a selection of training programs-
which ones were not determined at the time the contract was let-
but might include positions of Emergency Medical Technician and
Geriatric Nursing Assistant.1 79 Each of these is certificated upon
passing a state-administered test. The vendor explained that its se-
lection of training programs "will depend on the actual employ-
ment demands in the Baltimore area,"'8 ° but did not explain how,
[the individuals'] experiences in the workplace and classroom will provide the trainee
with a comprehensive training program which should lead to employment.").
175. BCDSS, FIPA, supra note 137, at 42 (summarizing Welfare to Work Academy
of Morgan State University).
176. BGI AGREEMENT, supra note 174 app.A, at 4, 8.
177. Id. at 2. If none were hired, then the vendor planned to "ask Omni to help us
locate a similar position" elsewhere downtown. Id.
178. E.g., INTERAGENCY AGREEMENT BETWEEN BALTIMORE CITY DEP'T OF SOC.
SERVS. & BALTIMORE CITY COMMUNITY COLLEGE, FOR EMPLOYMENT TRAINING
AND PLACEMENT SERVS. PROGRAM app.A. (1998) (stating that "this training program
is designed to support participants in achieving specific work skills which they will use
to acquire employment leading to careers").
179. Id.
180. Id.
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when, or on what information it would make that decision. Simi-
larly, Catholic Charities pledged to help recipients conduct "mean-
ingful career planning and job search," including certification
opportunities "in a field that could provide employment."'' Each
of these vague assertions was apparently accepted by the City as
compliance with the RFP requirement for demonstration that the
labor market in the Baltimore metropolitan area will support the
potential services the vendor proposes. The Chimes submitted the
most completely articulated training program, leading to a creden-
tial as a Developmental Disability Assistant. 182 It promised job
placement (much through its own hiring) of seventy percent of
graduates of the 124-hour training.18 3
The Chimes program illustrates a strength and a weakness of the
City's reliance on vendors to design its employment readiness pro-
gram. The weakness is "creaming"-the vendor selecting the
trainees most likely to complete training. For the valuable creden-
tial and job prospect it offered, the Chimes specified an extensive
list of prerequisites to enrollment, including academic, health, so-
cial, and, arguably, economic requirements.' 84 Chimes trainees
were to start with their high school diploma or GED in hand, and
in addition, a minimum of eighth grade proficiency in writing and
math.185 They must be in good health, pass a physical, and be able
to lift fifty pounds. 86 Trainees must pass both a drug screening test
and a criminal background check. 87 Furthermore, trainees were to
have a driver's license, and preferably be willing and able to accept
full-time employment in the field upon completion.188
Other vendors' creaming was less comprehensive, but still signif-
icant for Baltimore's citizens and taxpayers. Baltimore Goodwill's
hotel services program included drug and criminal background
screening, "to assure that we do not train a customer who could not
181. HEAD START AGREEMENT, supra note 174, at app.A. At the time of the con-
tract's signing, Catholic Charities operated three Head Start Centers in Baltimore
City, serving 600 children and their families. Id. The vendor suggested a ninety hour
certification in Early Childhood, and a Health Care certificate. Id.
182. CHIMES, supra note 174, at app.A. "The Chimes is a multi-services organiza-
tion assisting over 1600 children, adults, and senior systems." Id. Historically, the
Chimes aided individuals with mental retardation or other related handicapping con-
ditions, but has now "expanded its mission to serve people with financial barriers to
independence as well." Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
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be hired" by the partner hotels. 189 Some vendors specified literacy
prerequisites, while others' training includes assistance to secure
one's GED; America Works of Maryland required referrals to be
able to fill out its application form.19° Exclusion of "current sub-
stance abusers" was almost universal, and of persons with a "sub-
stance abuse history," common.19'
4. The Tally: Selling the People Short
Thus the sad tally. For $60 million, Baltimore got 2000 jobs for
more than 10,000 TANF families.' 92 Of the contracts let by
BCDSS covering 1998-99, seventeen contracts were let to thirteen
vendors: one private for-profit corporation,' 93 five non-profits,' 94
three public colleges, 19 and four City agencies. 96 The largest con-
tract went to the Office of Economic Development ("OED"), and
is producing twice as many work experience slots than job place-
ments for Baltimore's TANF citizens. The seventeen contracts
promised a total of 2058 jobs for TANF recipients who completed
the vendors' programs. More than twice as many people-4855-
were to receive services counting as "work experience" instead.
An additional 1267 persons would receive services "related" to em-
ployment, such as job search, job readiness, literacy instruction, or
community service. Altogether, this accounted for 8210 TANF re-
cipients-about 1500 fewer than the number of individuals esti-
mated to reach the twenty-four-month mark of receipt under
TANF, and thus required to comply with the work requirements.
189. BGI AGREEMENT, supra note 174, at app.A, at 2.
190. AGREEMENT BETWEEN BALTIMORE CITY DEP'T OF SOC. SERVS. & AMERICA
WORKS OF MARYLAND, FOR JOB TRAINING AND PLACEMENT SERVS., app. A. (1998).
191. E.g., BGI AGREEMENT, supra note 174, at app.A, at 2 (requiring background
checks and drug testing); CHIMES, supra note 174, at app.A (requiring physical exami-
nation including drug test).
192. BCDSS, FIPA, supra note 137, at 22 (stating that in FY 2000, more than
10,040 families will have received twenty-four-months in cash assistance); see also As-
SESSING THE GAPS, supra note 173, at 27. Although the number of individuals on
TANF has decreased by 41% in Baltimore City since 1994, this rate lags behind the
state's 55% reduction. Id.
193. America Works of Maryland.
194. Baltimore Urban League, Goodwill of Baltimore, Maryland New Directions,
the Chimes, and Park Heights Community Center.
195. Morgan State University, Sojourner-Douglass College, Baltimore City Com-
munity College.
196. Mayor's Office of Children and Youth; Head Start; Baltimore Department of
Housing and Community Development; and the Office of Employment
Development.
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5. Contract Management
Despite the modest promise of the RFPs, the contracts them-
selves reveal no meaningful benchmarks, outcomes, or control
mechanisms in the contracts subsequently let. There were no con-
trol provisions whatsoever in any of the contracts. Only two ven-
dors proposed that outcomes serve as a measure of performance.'
97
Only one vendor's proposal contemplated payment only for per-
formance. 198 The Agency has so far declined to provide any evi-
dence or assurance that any performance review is made.
Although Baltimore's revised plan acknowledged the need to
boost its evaluative capacity, 199 it is not apparent that it has in fact
evaluated the vendor services for which it spends public funds and
recipients' time-limited welfare support. As of this writing, an
outside evaluation promised in the FY 2000 report has not materi-
alized, nor does the program of vendor-contracted work services
reflect such evaluation.2°
At least one recent study found that, in this respect, Baltimore is
not at all unusual. Formal contract management is largely absent
in local government procurement, and few people responsible are
procurement professionals or have any formal training in contract
management.20 1 This may make some sense for contracts that
197. These were American Works of Maryland and Maryland New Directions.
198. America Works of Maryland proposed to be paid $5,490 per person still em-
ployed six months after placement, in full-time jobs with benefits; $4,320 per person
working at six months, without benefits.
199. BCDSS said it would contract with publicly funded colleges and universities to
provide "a myriad of services." Its illustrative list included: to provide research of
current needs, to identify the best practices from around the country, to bring to-
gether unnamed stakeholders, and to formulate short and long range strategies-to
what ends, were not stated. BCDSS, FIPA, supra note 137, at 12-13.
200. In the FY 2000 Plan, the City stated that it would contract with the University
of Baltimore (although no department, institute, or principal investigator was named)
specifically to evaluate the effectiveness of current vendor services, and to recom-
mend a continuum of services to meet the needs of the City. Id. at 13. Despite the
author's repeated requests to City officials, no such contract or report has been pro-
vided; nor is one referred to in Department SOPs, or on the websites of the relevant
local or state departments. The Plan makes further boilerplate assurances of account-
ability, by asserting in comparably elusive fashion, the intention to fund demonstra-
tion projects for the most cost effective service delivery models; to use "full
competitive procurement RFP processes" to replicate the most successful programs in
future years; and to establish "strategic planning committees including representatives
of all major stakeholders" that will "support, direct and evaluate the use of program
resources to serve each major target population." Id. "Coordination and collabora-
tion with all stakeholders will be a priority" to assure maximum leverage of all availa-
ble resources and minimize administrative costs. Id.
201. KEVIN LAVERY, SMART CONTRACTING FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICES:
PROCESSES AND EXPERIENCE 71 (1999).
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specify inputs rather than outcomes. But given the RFPs' formal
requirement for vendors' monthly reports of employment secured,
it is not apparent whether the absence of actual government moni-
toring and oversight implies the assumption that vendors would
perform smoothly,20 2 or the assumption that they would fail.
III. LESSONS LEARNED ABOUT LOCALIZED-PRiVATIZED
SERVICE DELIVERY OF PUBLIC OBJECTIVES
In the welfare arena, the passing of the old AFDC program to
the new Act marked a significant change in the character and
methods of the federal government's responsibilities for the sub-
stance and effectiveness of public welfare for needy families. Its
alteration of the framework for welfare implementation, and its
embrace of contractual welfare, also alters the analysis that use-
fully can gird the welfare policy debate.
A. What Does Local Government Want?
Government needs to know what it wants from the contracts let
at public expense. And citizens need to know what the govern-
ment is buying, in their names, with the public's money.
The privatization of government service delivery presents a para-
dox: it is said repeatedly that citizens believe government should
contract out for services because government is not competent to
deliver the services, and yet, government must be very competent
to design, let, and monitor effective service contracts. °3 Four
phases for effective contract management are useful to identify-
services planning, contract negotiation and writing, contract award,
and contract monitoring and evaluation.2 °4 To plan intelligently for
202. Id. at 72. Lavery's study includes Baltimore's contract with a private vendor,
EAI, to run certain public schools, as an example of light monitoring. While one of-
fice scrutinized bills and payments, no official was responsible for assessing the quality
of the contractor's performance, and no reports on the quality and nature of the per-
formance were in fact required of EAI. Only general performance data for all of the
City's public schools were available, which could not be correlated to specific schools
or actions of the contractor. Id.
203. JOHN A. O'LOONEY, OUTSOURCING STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT SER-
VICES: DECISION-MAKING STRATEGIES AND MANAGEMENT METHODS 31 (1998).
O'Looney's book is a highly useful analysis of the ethical, political, budgetary, and
legal issues to be addressed when assessing whether outsourcing is likely to provide
results in the public interest.
204. Id. at 61 (citing Peter M. Kettner & Lawrence L. Martin, Purchase of Service at
20, Are We Using it Well?, 52 PUB. WELFARE 14-20 (1994) (in a survey of state-level
human service agency executives, formal objective assessments of need for the ser-
vices are made infrequently)).
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services to be contracted out requires a statement of the needs that
the contract will address, in terms of social indicators or perform-
ance data. °5
Monitoring and performance measurement are the key elements
of contract administration because of their significant contribution
to the success of contracting out.20 6 Methods of monitoring com-
monly include the review of contractor reports and inspections or
observations, but also may include citizen surveys or reliance on
citizen complaints.20 7 Legally, of course, all that can be demanded
is adherence to the contract. Thus the outcomes expected must be
stated as performance standards in order to demand actual con-
tractor performance. 0 8
Outsourcing in human services is viewed widely as the most
complex context for the practice, precisely because it can be so dif-
ficult to state specific outcome goals or measures, yet human-ser-
vices providers have participated in the larger movement to
evaluate programs based more on results than on attempts.2 0 9
It is fair to inquire whether all fault for an ill-formed strategy lies
with the agency. As noted in Part II supra, local welfare agencies
have been asked to do a very big job, for which few were prepared
at the creation of TANF. Baltimore may exemplify many other
local governments that demanded no more of themselves prior to
the new regime of Contractual Welfare. The City might assert that,
when welfare reform began, the state of knowledge was such that
effective performance standards could not be set. This argument
falls away on a quick perusal of research available at that time.210
A major failure of JOBS was that the U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services only held state programs accountable for par-
205. Id. at 65.
206. E.g., JOHN A. REHFUSS, CONTRACTING OUT IN GOVERNMENT 84 (1989).
207. Id. at 87.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 219-20. Some examples include Annie Casey Foundation's Children's
Initiative. Although performance measures and work specifications must vary accord-
ing to the particular services (child welfare, school readiness, job placement), certain
necessary elements are common. O'Looney recommends: a list of all the types of care
and services that will be provided by the vendor; a complete operations manual con-
cerning administration, including forms and data elements in the information system;
staffing requirements, including charts, minimum qualifications, training expectations,
and requirements for staff and facility certifications to be kept current; and require-
ments for evaluation. Id. at 224-25.
210. See generally BROOKINGS INST., LOOKING BEFORE WE LEAP: SOCIAL SCIENCE
AND WELFARE REFORM (R. Kent Weaver & William Dickens eds., 1995).
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ticipation, not employment.2 1' In the New Economy, the issue is
the availability of jobs, their accessibility, and support sufficiency-
not their number.
This is not a job for local government alone.
Private actors are even further removed from direct accountabil-
ity than are the local agencies, which must submit to legislative,
executive, and judicial oversight. Administrative law scholars have
worried that private vendors may lack the norms of public service
and of professionalism, which characterize many public bureaucra-
cies. Accordingly, some have prescribed greater constraints on pri-
vate power in devolution and contracting out. Many have called
for recommitment to the notion that certain key functions of gov-
ernment must remain the exclusive responsibility of the state. An-
other approach is to extend procedural controls to private actors.212
Some commentators suggest imposition through the common law
of norms of due process,213 good faith, and nonarbitrariness.21 4
211. WELFARE TO WORK: MEASURING OUTCOMES FOR JOBS PARTICIPANTS,
GAO/HEHS-95-86, at 2 (1995) (concluding that, after spending about $8 billion be-
tween 1989 and 1994, HHS "does not know whether JOBS is reducing welfare depen-
dency because it does not gather enough information on critical program outcomes").
In the absence of a federal approach to such data, several state programs used more
informative data statistics, including: participant entered employment (49 states),
hourly wages at hire (42 states), job retention rate (26 states), achievement of educa-
tion/training credential (24 states). Id. at 9. In 1994, HHS promised Congress to do
better. The GAO observed that "HHS and performance monitoring system experts
agree that the first critical step in developing outcome indicators and performance
goals is to reach agreement among stakeholders, such as the Congress, researchers,
and federal, state and local officials, regarding the objectives of the program." Id. at
17. The disagreement was this: 80% of state program directors responding in the
survey viewed the "overriding objective" was to prepare and place participants in
employment that allows them "to move off and stay off" welfare. The other 20%
viewed their objective as getting participants employed "in any job, part- or full-
time," even if the job might not allow them to leave welfare behind. Id. at 17-18.
The Job Training Partnership Act ("JTPA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1792 (2000), in con-
trast, did establish outcome measures as standards for states' performance. JTPA col-
lected data on hard to serve participants (recipients of welfare or food stamps, those
deficient in basic skills, persons with disabilities, or school dropouts). GAO, JOBS
AND JTPA, TRACKING SPENDING, OUTCOMES AND PROGRAM PERFORMANCE, GAO/
HEHS-94-177, at 13 (July 15, 1994). JTPA's minimum standards included employment
rates and wages at thirteen weeks after program termination, and since 1992, unsub-
sidized employment for not less than six months. Id. at 14 (stating separate standards
for all adults including welfare recipients, and for adult welfare recipients alone).
212. Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543,
572 (2000) (stating that "every aspect of policymaking, implementation, and enforce-
ment depends on the combined efforts of public and private actors").
213. Id. at 589; see also F. Eric Fryar, Note, Common-Law Due Process in the Law
of Contracts, 66 TEX. L. REv. 1021 (1988).
214. Michael Asimow, The Private Due Process Train is Leaving the Station, 23 AD-
MIN. REG. L. NEWS 8 (1998).
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The fulcrum of this analysis, however, is BCDSS, a unit of govern-
ment, not a private actor. Its failures to direct and manage con-
tracts to serve the citizenry well illustrate the need for resolution of
the democracy and accountability issues at the larger level of politi-
cal organization.
B. What Do Citizens Need? State Limits on
Local Policy Implementation
Proponents of double-devolution to local governments for wel-
fare policy and implementation draw on a bottom-up tradition that
celebrates interlocal variation and emphasizes local decision-mak-
ing autonomy, local responsibility for services delivered locally,
and local political accountability to the electorate. In theory, this
model of localism responds to the preferences of the people of dif-
ferent localities.215
But this is only half the reality. Local governments are also crea-
tures of the state, established as political subdivisions of the state
and granted their legal authority, including their regulatory and
public service powers and responsibilities, from the state's constitu-
tion, statutes, and state-granted charters. The state's decisions are
fundamental to the very existence, and certainly the scope, of local
powers and responsibilities.
Thus it is conceptual error to read out the state-level govern-
ment, which government has a duty to assure fair treatment to all
the people within its borders. This obligation must affect the
state's delegation of powers to local governments. The state en-
compasses all the local political units, and is politically accountable
to all the people in the state. This is surely the case when local
governments, adjacent to each other, discharge effects on their
neighboring jurisdictions. Only the state can police such externali-
ties of local action sufficiently to hold local governments accounta-
ble for the responsibilities delegated down. Thus the state ought to
ensure that local governments are locally accountable and autono-
mous in local matters, but the state also ought to ensure the state's
oversight of local performance, and monitor the ability of local
governments to perform effectively the functions entrusted to
them.
215. E.g, Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON.
416 (1956); Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I-The Structure of Local Govern-
ment Law, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1990).
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C. What Can Citizens Do? Upgrading the
Toolkit of Citizen Action
The familiar tools of political accountability are of diminished
and uncertain utility, but are not gone from the arena. Nonethe-
less, to aid citizens now in insisting upon local government's ac-
countability under the new regime of contractual welfare, they will
require significant upgrades.
It has been much too hard to collect the information relevant to
this citizen's audit of Baltimore's vendor system. The documents
that frame the City's expenditure in service of its "work not wel-
fare" mantra ought to be publicly available. At the minimum, the
state and City Family Investment Plans, the RFPs, the contracts
with successful vendors, and independent evaluations of the pro-
gram ought to be readily accessible in a public reading room main-
tained by the Agency and accessible by Internet. During the
course of this project, Baltimore's Web access began as abysmal,
and has become no more informative. Low-tech options for get-
ting information, such as requests by phone and letter, suffer seri-
ously from limited staffing. But it also is fair to infer that local
government is not anxious to publicize its premises or perform-
ance. The independent evaluation of the local vendor program has
produced no interim report, nor is the identity of the evaluator
publicly available. No useful documents have been available on
Baltimore's web page for the Department of Social Services gener-
ally, or the Family Investment Program specifically. The state's
page is only slightly more informative.216
As citizens and government, we must search for ways to "incen-
tivize" local governments and their contractual partners, to provide
the information that citizens need and to which we are entitled.
This information is not private in the way that some details of
sealed bids are deemed proprietary under procurement rules. One
important route is to redistribute access to the fora for policy for-
mation. New tools to enhance the democratic accountability of lo-
cal government might include new reporting requirements on local
governments, and the creation of an ombudsman with powers of
inquiry and public hearing. These tools should function at the
stage of policy formulation, as well as at program performance
evaluation.
216. The Maryland State Department of Human Resources Web page includes the
revised State Plan, at http://www.dhr.state.md.us.
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The complex interactions between welfare policy and the
swirling changes in wage work argue also to expand the stake-
holder table to include the citizens experienced with TANF and its
work-related programs-those citizens most affected and least con-
sulted about decisions otherwise made by elected officials, bureau-
crats, and entrepreneurs. One vehicle to accomplish this could be a
Community Congress, to be held quarterly, to elicit the input of
TANF customers and affected communities, including locally oper-
ating employers, as a source of guidance for the services offered by
vendors.
New mechanisms to enhance democracy also should incorporate
more clear-eyed attention to the substance that makes for more
accountability in the design and conduct of government policy.
Whatever revamped entity is forming policy, it should employ
some means to learn the state of the relevant research. Over-local-
izing an inherently regional problem such as building employment
capacity for welfare-users badly serves the purported political the-
ory of devolution to enhance democracy. It is essential that we
eschew provincialism, and seek to avoid the pitfalls of reliance only
on local and state resident institutions, to solve problems larger
than the locality. To do so will require state and local government
first to expand the pool of relevant types of expertise. The usual
cast of procurement and other officials cannot do it alone. Con-
sultative partnerships with affected communities, with the state
workforce development communities, coupled with serious study
of the wealth of best practices and program studies generated by
independent research entities, would better prepare states and
their local units for shared problem-solving.
Another model would be the development of an intermediary
organization, to serve as a resource both to citizens and to govern-
ment entities. Such an organization should be designed to tap the
growing resources of experience and expertise engaged in the im-
portant task of maximizing the independence of our neediest citi-
zens. A real-life version of the www.welfareinfo.org site could
facilitate exchange across state and local welfare programs, em-
ployers, advocates, non-profits, academics, and affected clients and
communities.
Specific functions might well include providing professional,
non-parochial evaluation of contemplated requests for proposals;
the creation of standards for performance; and performance moni-
toring, as well as promoting the capacity of affected community
residents to participate actively in these processes. When it is sen-
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sible to contract for specific services, government actors need to
know what is needed, so that they can prepare bid documents and
contracts reflecting the planned scope of services, prescribe
benchmarks, and enforce standards.
What should local government want? The confluence of an ac-
tive Community Congress and a wider-than-local lens on what is
possible would allow state and local governments to see more than
merely cutting the welfare rolls. Our government should seek to
increase employment and decrease poverty, while it seeks to re-
duce dependence on welfare. To that end, its contracts with work-
services vendors must be designed to secure employment in a
value-added sense-thus leading to jobs, sustained at length, at
wages above poverty-level.
As a new beginning in this effort, Maryland should return at
least the first three years of the five-year lifetime limit to the
thousands of welfare parents who complied with work activities
under Baltimore's paltry "Family Investment" Program, while the
welfare agency failed to adequately conceptualize or implement its
side of the independence bargain.
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